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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This study explores the governance of water reservoirs in the Mazandaran province, Northern Iran, from the 
perspective of public and private sectors at the regional level, as well as local stakeholders within the communities. 
Although water management in Iran has been frequently investigated, research which specifically addresses the 
governance of water reservoirs in the Mazandaran province from perspective of various stakeholders is not existent. 
The traditional water reservoirs in the Mazandaran province called Ab-bandan are used to collect the precipitation 
during autumn and winter seasons to be used for irrigating rice fields during the growing seasons (spring and summer). 
In spite of these reservoirs, a significant amount of precipitation runs off into the sea through rivers and only less than 
10% of precipitation is being stored in Ab-bandans. This is due to the challenges in governing these water reservoirs 
such as lack of strategic planning of administrative bodies. This draws attention to the poor governance of water 
reservoirs in the Mazandaran province, which presents a major challenge to ensure the security of water supply, and 
in particular for rice production. Thus, the objectives of this study are: 1) to identify gaps in the governance of Ab-
bandans, 2) to identify and assess the policy instruments for the improvement of the governance of Ab-bandans, and 
3) to investigate the influence of social capital components on the governance of Ab-bandans among local stakeholders.
These objectives form the papers of this cumulative Ph.D. dissertation.  
The first paper reveals water governance gaps with the focus on Ab-bandans using the ‘OECD's Multi-level 
Governance Framework’ as a conceptual basis. This framework is a guideline for policy-makers in all countries in 
order to distinguish public governance gaps regardless of the institutional setting. Identifying the gaps could provide 
an input for policy-makers in order to prioritize options to strengthen the governance of Ab-bandans. A modified 
Delphi technique was used to identify these gaps by face-to-face interviews and ranking round. Interviews were 
conducted with individuals working in public agencies and the private sector pertaining to water management. The 
results show that the lack of a specific law for Ab-bandans is perceived as the most acute gap. However, the significant 
issue is that there is interdependence among all the gaps and they can strengthen one another. Therefore, a holistic 
perspective is needed to understand and resolve the gaps in the governance of Ab-bandans. There is no magic or ‘one-
size-fits-all’ approach to overcome the gaps and a mix of solutions is required.   
The second paper refers to identify relevant water policy instruments and assessing the suitability of these multiple 
instruments in an integrated way towards good governance of Ab-bandans. Water policy instruments are tools, 
strategies, and mechanisms for policy-makers to overcome governance obstacles in water policy; for instance, 
involving sub-national governments in designing water policy beyond their roles as implementers is a policy instrument 
to foster effective water management. An exploratory sequential design was realized as a mixed methods approach 
(qualitative and quantitative) for the purpose of research. The results reveal that policy instruments identified properly 
contribute to the improvement of the governance of Ab-bandans. Participation and collective action among farmers 
have the highest priority for the improvement of water governance. Therefore, it can be seen as the starting point for 
the desired transformation. Moreover, the policy instruments are interdependent and shouldn’t be addressed in 
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isolation. The improvement of the governance of Ab-bandans should be systematic and it is not possible to apply a 
single policy instrument without considering the impact of other policy instruments. It is necessary to adopt the policy 
instruments in a holistic way to solve difficulties in the governance of Ab-bandans.   
The third paper explores aspects of social capital in the governance of Ab-bandans seeking explanations as to how and 
why components of social capital among various local stakeholders influence the water reservoirs-related interactions 
within the communities. Social capital is an important factor, which facilitates collective interaction of the local 
community’ members for water system sustainability. Therefore, this study investigates key social capital components 
(i.e. trust, co-operation, social network cohesion, leaders and their roles, and conflict resolution) affecting the 
governance of Ab-bandans among local stakeholders. The qualitative method was applied to achieve the purpose of 
research. Semi-structured, face-to-face interviews were conducted with a range of local key stakeholders of Ab-
bandans. The study shows that the level of social capital and its importance can differ depending on which component 
is under investigation. According to the results, mechanisms for conflict resolution are the most important aspect of 
social capital which plays a significant role for the other components. Social relationships and cohesion are being 
reduced due to the conflicts in water management and lack of appropriate mechanisms for resolution. Therefore, 
resolution of conflicts can bring people together in the group events to communicate and address their common issues 
and promote their co-operation for collective decision-making and planning. The results of the study support the idea 
that the management of Ab-bandans in a collective manner at the local level in the Mazandaran province needs to take 
all components of social capital into consideration. This would enable local communities to be more resilient in the 
face of collective action problems.  
Overall, it can be concluded that managing water reservoirs in the Mazandaran province, Northern Iran requires 
collaborative efforts between various stakeholders within and between the local communities. The government should 
undertake the role of facilitator rather than governmentality, by using participatory and bottom-up processes for 
decision-making, planning, and resolving conflicts among local stakeholders. The government should establish 
effective strategies of governance to engage farmers in management decisions and empower and integrate them to be 
able to solve their problems in water-related issues. There is also an urgent need for co-operation and participation not 
only between local stakeholders and responsive public agencies at the regional level, but also among public agencies 
in charge of water policy design and implementation. As the government is the owner and manager of water resources, 
better management and utilization of Ab-bandans will only succeed if accompanied by a shift in public governance 
through the engagement of all relevant actors. 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Diese Studie untersucht die ‚governance‘ von Wasserreservoirs im Nordiran und in der Provinz Mazandaran aus der 
Sicht des öffentlichen und privaten Sektors auf regionaler Ebene sowie der lokalen Akteure in den Gemeinden. Obwohl 
die Wasserwirtschaft im Iran bereits häufig untersucht wurde, gibt es keine Forschung, die sich speziell mit der 
Steuerung und dem Management von Wasserreservoirs in der Provinz Mazandaran aus der Sicht verschiedener 
Interessengruppen befasst. Die traditionellen Wasserreservoirs in der Provinz Mazandaran, genannt Ab-bandan, 
werden verwendet, um den Niederschlag während der Herbst- und Wintersaison zu sammeln, der für die Bewässerung 
von Reisfeldern während der Vegetationsperiode (Frühjahr und Sommer) verwendet wird. Trotz dieser Stauseen fließt 
ein erheblicher Teil der Niederschläge über Flüsse ins Meer und nur weniger als 10% der Niederschläge werden in Ab-
bandans gespeichert. Dies ist auf die Herausforderungen bei der Bewirtschaftung dieser Wasserreservoirs 
zurückzuführen, wie z.B. das Fehlen einer strategischen Planung der Verwaltungsbehörden. Dies macht auf die 
schlechte Verwaltung der Wasserreservoirs in der Provinz Mazandaran aufmerksam, die eine große Herausforderung 
darstellt, um die Sicherheit der Wasserversorgung zu gewährleisten und die Reisproduktion zu unterstützen. So sind 
die Ziele dieser Studie: 1) Lücken in der Governance von Ab-bandans zu identifizieren, 2) die politischen Instrumente 
zur Verbesserung der Governance von Ab-bandans zu identifizieren und zu bewerten, und 3) den Einfluss von 
Sozialkapitalkomponenten auf die Governance von Ab-bandans unter lokalen Interessengruppen zu untersuchen. Diese 
Ziele bilden den Untersuchungsgegenstand der  einzelnen Papiere dieser kumulativen Dissertation.   
Das erste Papier zeigt Lücken in der Wasserbewirtschaftung auf, wobei der Schwerpunkt auf Ab-bandans liegt und 
das "OECD Multi-level Governance Framework" als konzeptionelle Grundlage dient. Dieser Rahmen ist eine Leitlinie 
für politische Entscheidungsträger in allen Ländern, um Lücken in der öffentlichen Verwaltung unabhängig vom 
institutionellen Umfeld zu erkennen. Die Identifizierung der Lücken könnte einen Beitrag für die politischen 
Entscheidungsträger leisten, um Optionen zur Stärkung der Governance von Ab-bandans zu priorisieren. Eine 
modifizierte Technik der Delphi-Methode wurde verwendet, um diese Lücken durch persönliche Interviews und eine 
Ranking-Runde zu identifizieren. Es wurden Interviews mit Personen durchgeführt, die in öffentlichen Einrichtungen 
und der Privatwirtschaft im Bereich der Wasserwirtschaft tätig sind. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass das Fehlen eines 
spezifischen Gesetzes für Ab-bandans die größte Lücke ist. Das wesentliche Problem ist jedoch, dass eine 
Interdependenz zwischen allen Defiziten besteht und diese sich gegenseitig verstärken können. Daher ist eine 
ganzheitliche Perspektive erforderlich, um die Lücken in der Governance von Ab-bandans zu verstehen und zu 
schließen. Es gibt keinen ‚magischen‘ oder "one-size-fits-all"-Ansatz, um die Lücken zu schließen, sondern es ist ein 
Mix von Lösungen erforderlich.   
Das zweite Papier bezieht sich auf die Identifizierung relevanter wasserpolitischer Instrumente und die Bewertung der 
Eignung dieser verschiedenen Instrumente auf integrierte Weise für eine gute Governance der Ab-bandans. 
Wasserpolitische Instrumente sind Instrumente, Strategien und Mechanismen für politische Entscheidungsträger, um 
Governance-Hindernisse in der Wasserpolitik zu überwinden; beispielsweise ist die Einbeziehung subnationaler 
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Regierungen in die Gestaltung der Wasserpolitik über ihre Rolle als Umsetzer hinaus ein politisches Instrument zur 
Förderung einer effektiven Wasserwirtschaft. Ein exploratives sequentielles Design wurde als gemischter 
Methodenansatz (qualitativ und quantitativ) für Forschungszwecke umgesetzt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die 
identifizierten politischen Instrumente ordnungsgemäß zur Verbesserung der Governance von Ab-bandans beitragen. 
Die Beteiligung und gemeinsame Aktionen der Landwirte haben höchste Priorität für die Verbesserung der 
Wasserwirtschaft. Sie kann daher als Ausgangspunkt für die gewünschte Transformation angesehen werden. Darüber 
hinaus sind die politischen Instrumente voneinander abhängig und sollten nicht isoliert betrachtet werden. Die 
Verbesserung der Governance von Ab-bandans sollte systematisch erfolgen, und es ist nicht möglich, ein einziges 
politisches Instrument anzuwenden, ohne die Auswirkungen anderer politischer Instrumente zu berücksichtigen. Es ist 
notwendig, die politischen Instrumente auf ganzheitliche Weise anzuwenden, um Schwierigkeiten bei der Verwaltung 
von Ab-bandans zu lösen.   
Das dritte Papier untersucht Aspekte des Sozialkapitals bei der Verwaltung von Ab-bandans und sucht nach 
Erklärungen, wie und warum Komponenten des Sozialkapitals zwischen verschiedenen lokalen Interessengruppen die 
wasserspeicherbezogenen Interaktionen innerhalb der Gemeinschaften beeinflussen. Sozialkapital ist ein wichtiger 
Faktor, der die Interaktionen in der lokalen Gemeinschaft für die Nachhaltigkeit des Wassersystems ermöglicht. Daher 
untersucht diese Studie die einzelnen Komponenten des Sozialkapitals (d.h. Vertrauen, Zusammenarbeit, 
Zusammenhalt der sozialen Netzwerke, Führungskräfte und ihre Rollen sowie Konfliktlösung), die sich auf die 
Governance von Ab-bandans unter den lokalen Interessengruppen auswirken. Teilstrukturierte, persönliche Interviews 
wurden mit einer Reihe von lokalen Schlüsselfiguren von Ab-bandans durchgeführt. Diese Studie zeigt, dass das 
Niveau des Sozialkapitals und seine Bedeutung je nachdem, welche Komponente untersucht wird, unterschiedlich sein 
können. Den Ergebnissen zufolge sind Mechanismen zur Konfliktlösung der wichtigste Aspekt des Sozialkapitals, der 
für die anderen Komponenten eine wichtige Rolle spielt. Die sozialen Beziehungen und der Zusammenhalt werden 
durch die Konflikte in der Wasserwirtschaft und das Fehlen geeigneter Lösungsmechanismen beinträchtigt. Daher 
kann die Konfliktlösung als Prozess Menschen in Gruppenveranstaltungen zusammenbringen, um zu kommunizieren 
und ihre gemeinsamen Themen anzusprechen und die Zusammenarbeit bei gemeinsamen Entscheidungen und 
Planungen zu fördern. Die Ergebnisse der Studie unterstützen die Idee, dass das kollektive Management von Ab-
bandans auf lokaler Ebene in der Provinz Mazandaran alle Komponenten des Sozialkapitals berücksichtigen muss. 
Dies würde es den lokalen Gemeinschaften ermöglichen, bei Problemen mit kollektiven Maßnahmen 
widerstandsfähiger zu sein.  
Insgesamt lässt sich sagen, dass die Bewirtschaftung von Wasserreservoirs im Nordiran und in der Provinz Mazandaran 
eine Zusammenarbeit zwischen verschiedenen Interessengruppen innerhalb und zwischen den lokalen Gemeinschaften 
erfordert. Die Regierung kann die Rolle des Moderators und nicht der Gouvernementalität übernehmen, indem sie 
partizipative und Bottom-up-Prozesse zur Entscheidungsfindung, Planung und Lösung von Konflikten zwischen 
lokalen Interessengruppen einsetzt. Die Regierung kann effektive Governance-Strategien entwickeln, um die 
Landwirte in Managemententscheidungen einzubeziehen und sie zu befähigen und zu integrieren, damit sie ihre 
Probleme in wasserbezogenen Fragen lösen können. Daher besteht auch dringender Bedarf an Zusammenarbeit und 
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Beteiligung nicht nur zwischen lokalen Interessengruppen und öffentlichen Stellen auf regionaler Ebene, sondern auch 
zwischen öffentlichen Stellen, die für die Gestaltung und Umsetzung der Wasserpolitik zuständig sind. Da die 
Regierung Eigentümer und Verwalter der Wasserressourcen ist, wird eine bessere Verwaltung und Nutzung der Ab-
bandans nur dann erfolgreich sein, wenn sie von einer Veränderung der öffentlichen Verwaltung durch das 
Engagement aller relevanten Akteure begleitet wird. 
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2 
1 Introduction 
“The consequences of water shortage are costly today, but will be exponentially more expensive 
in the future” 
 (Jim Yong Kim, World Bank Group President, 2016)
Water is the main component required for the production of food supplies (Kumar, 2003). The key message of the 
International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP, 2005: 3) is “without water, there is no agriculture”. The 
world's population will reach 9.8 billion by 2050 which will lead to the need for further food production in the future, 
and consequently, the demand for water will increase by more than 40% (Nazari et al., 2018). By 2025, 1.8 billion 
people will live in regions where there is absolute water scarcity and currently, 768 million people are suffering from 
lack of access to water (Islam and Susskind, 2015). Therefore, the water crisis is listed as the largest global risk and 
is becoming a threat to the sustainable development of human society due to increasing demand (Mekonnen and 
Hoekstra, 2016). The Middle East is one of the most affected regions of water stress and is presently in an alarming 
situation, in terms of serious consequences for human development (Islam and Susskind, 2015). Since 1950, 
freshwater availability has decreased by 75% in the following three Middle Eastern countries: Iran, Iraq, and Saudi 
Arabia and an additional 50% will be added to this reduction by 2030 (Procházka et al., 2018). In developing 
countries like Iran, over 90% of the total renewable water resources are used in the agricultural sector which is the 
greatest consumer of water; therefore, effective water resource management in this sector plays a critical role in 
water security and satisfactory productivity (Samian et al., 2015).   
OECD (2011) noted that many water-related crises are not related to water shortage, because sufficient water is 
available for all people everywhere, even in areas where there is a temporary shortage of water, but the water crisis is 
caused by the mismanagement and crisis in governance. Orr et al. (2009) pointed out that water-related problems are 
normally due to a complex interaction of social, economic, and environmental determinants, and not a lack of 
precipitation. The Global Water Partnership (GWP) observed that “The water crisis is mainly a crisis of governance” 
(GWP, 2000: 16). OECD (2011) reported that “The current water crisis is not a crisis of scarcity but a crisis of 
mismanagement, with strong public governance features”. The crisis of water governance is due to the lack of clear 
allocation of roles and responsibilities, lack of stakeholder participation, asymmetric and unshared information, 
inadequate capacity to tackle the risks, etc. (Romano and Akhmouch, 2019). Hamdy (2012) stated that the failure of 
institutions to manage water resources is the main reason for the water governance crisis. Achieving effective water 
governance requires “an enabling environment and appropriate institutional structures that allow stakeholders to 
work together for effective water management. Financial practices must be realigned to support the sustainable use 
of water resources” (GWP, 2000: 16). These aims can be achieved through powerful administrative organization in 
water management, a legally embedded system of water law, an adequate financing system, systematic planning, and 
the participation of stakeholders (Havekes et al., 2013). This information draws attention to design empirical 
research on water governance in Northern Iran which is currently encountering a serious water crisis. 
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1.1 Problem background 
Iran is located in an arid and semi-arid area of the world and average annual precipitation is about 250 mm, 
approximately one-third of the world's average precipitation of 814 mm, which occurs mostly from October to March 
(Amiri and Eslamian, 2010; Karandish and Hoekstra, 2017; Lehane, 2014; Madani, 2014). The annual precipitation 
varies greatly across the country from about 1,800 mm over the Western Caspian Sea coast, to less than 50 mm over 
the Eastern deserts (Amiri and Eslamian, 2010). Most regions receive less than 100 mm precipitation per year, and 
75% of the precipitation occurs in only 25% of the country’s area (Karandish and Hoekstra, 2017). In Northern Iran, 
the Caspian Seashores have an annual precipitation of about 500 mm in the East to 1800 mm in the West, which is 
considerable in comparison to other parts of the country (Amiri and Eslamian, 2010). Furthermore, 75% of the 
precipitation occurs during autumn and winter when it is not required in the agricultural sector and also summer 
precipitation occurs only in the Caspian Sea coast, northwest and southeast part of the county (Madani, 2014). 
Accordingly, precipitation in Iran does not have spatial and temporal uniformity (Raziei et al., 2008).  
Currently, Iran is suffering from an acute water crisis and facing unprecedented water-related problems such as the 
shrinkage of a significant number of lakes and rivers, declining groundwater, floods, droughts etc. (Madani et al., 
2016). Although the climate has varied over the centuries, Iran has always been located in an arid and semi-arid 
region; therefore, it should not be assumed (as is often the case) that water is scarce in Iran (Yazdanpanah et al., 
2013). Undoubtedly, ancient Iranian people were successful in developing innovative methods of regulating, 
withdrawing, transferring, redirecting, and distributing water to establish an appropriate socio-economic and 
regulatory setting for effective water management in this arid area of the world where water availability is seasonal 
(Madani, 2014; Madani et al., 2016). However, modern day Iran is not able to put these historically familiar facts 
into practice, due to the current structure of the water governance system and the absence of a comprehensive 
understanding of the root causes of the problem (Foltz, 2002; Madani et al., 2016).  
About 97% of the country is experiencing drought conditions (Shahi, 2019). Lake Urmia (the largest lake in the 
Middle East and one of the world’s largest hypersaline lakes), has shrunk significantly as a result of frequent 
droughts, aggressive upstream water use, diversion, and storage. The water stand is only 10% of its volume and it 
will literally turn into a desert within the next 15 years (Ashraf Vaghefi et al., 2019; Madani, 2014; Navabi, 2017). 
Hamun Lake in east Iran, the Parishan and Shadegan lakes in the south, and the Zayandeh-Rud River in the center of 
Iran are also at risk of disappearing (Ashraf Vaghefi et al., 2019). The main source of water used for domestic and 
agricultural purposes in Iran is groundwater and this is also in a critical condition due to overexploitation (Ashraf 
Vaghefi et al., 2019; Jafary and Bradley, 2018). Furthermore, many villages have become deserts, and rural people 
have migrated to cities. Some officials predict that over the next 25 years, 50 million Iranians will migrate due to the 
ecological conditions in the country (Shahi, 2015). Iran is becoming a country of “ghost towns” due to massive 
environmental migration (Navabi, 2017). This shows that Iran’s main enemy is not Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United 
States etc. but the real enemy is within the country and this is the environmental challenges, mainly water bankruptcy 
(Shahi, 2015). This leads to the question: What has caused this situation in Iran, despite the familiarity with its 
historical reality? 
The Iranian government claims that the current water crisis is caused by climate change, frequent droughts, and 
international sanctions to conceal the inefficient water management system. These exogenous issues are only crisis 
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catalyzers, not the main cause of the water crisis (Madani, 2014). Many Iranian experts claim that the 
most significant cause of the water crisis is failure in water governance (Foltz, 2002), which includes 
planning, managerial, political, and institutional problems (Madani, 2014). Water governance is a set of collective 
activities to secure the water systems viability and integrity and to achieve common goals with the help of 
diverse stakeholder groups (Wiek and Larson, 2012). Unfortunately, water experts and policymakers in Iran 
have a different understanding of the causes of the water crisis, which prevents comprehensive planning for effective 
water management. Ultimately, local communities have other definitions, plans, and solutions to solve the water 
crisis (Jafary and Bradley, 2018).
Decision-makers ignore long-term goals and aim at achieving short-term and immediate economic benefits during 
their administration. They are not looking for fundamental solutions or resolutions to the main causes of these 
problems but try to eliminate the signs of the problems and prevent the emergence of them until the end of 
their power (Madani, 2014). Many government schemes to improve water management are in strong contrast 
with the socio-ecological conditions of the communities due to lack of cooperation between local water users and 
authorities (Jafary and Bradley, 2018). Water conflicts and dissatisfaction among the people are rising 
and they are demonstrating against systemic corruption, nepotism, mismanagement, and 
unaccountability; they see the government as their enemy (Shahi, 2019). The lack of co-operative behavior 
between groundwater users causes some environmental issues i.e. water exploitation from aquifers and land 
subsidence. There are many illegal wells in aquifers and there is no adequate supervision regarding water 
withdrawals which increases pressure on the groundwater resources (Moridi, 2017). National statistics in Iran 
shows that about 500,000 wells are operated by local farmers, and many of them do not have a license or 
permission (Karandish et al., 2018). Due to various difficulties in water governance, there is an absolute need 
to investigate this issue in order to understand challenges in water governance, and to find solutions for 
ensuring effective water governance. Since Iran is facing a water crisis, this research could provide 
useful information for optimizing the use of limited water resources. 
1.2 Problem statement
The total surface water in Iran is approx. 92 billion m3, of which approx. 11.65 billion m3 belongs to the three 
Northern provinces of the country (i.e. Mazandaran, Gilan, and Golestan) (Ministry of Agriculture Iran, 2016). The 
average storage of surface water in the three Northern provinces is less than 10% and the Mazandaran province has 
the worse conditions for storing surface water (Ministry of Agriculture Iran, 2016). The Mazandaran province has a 
potential of 6.8 billion m3 of water resources, of which 4.9 billion m3 is surface water. Only 2.2 billion cubic m3 
of this surface water is used and the rest either runs off into the sea through rivers and streams, or it causes 
water-logging or flooding which reduces soil fertility and negatively affects rice production (Ejlali et al., 2012; 
Ministry of Agriculture Iran, 2016). The Mazandaran province is the second wettest province in Iran, but it faces 
water shortage during the growing seasons, although rice fields are saturated with water during the rainy seasons, 
which leads to a decrease of oxygen to the roots and consequently reduces the fertility of fields (Ministry of 
Agriculture Iran, 2016).   
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There are traditional water reservoirs in the Mazandaran province called Ab-bandan which are used for the collection 
of precipitation during autumn and winter. This water is used for irrigating rice fields during the growing seasons 
(spring and summer) (Abbasian et al., 2014). Typically, these have been constructed by local farmers since around 
3000 years based on available materials and indigenous engineering knowledge. The Ab-bandan is built by digging 
the land and compressing the soil to construct a wall around the excavated pond (Ejlali et al., 2012; Ghoddousi, 
1999; Rahimi Farahani et al., 2012). In spite of these reservoirs, a significant amount of precipitation runs off into the 
sea through rivers and less than 10% of precipitation is being stored in Ab-bandans (Azmoodeh et al., 2009). This 
draws attention to the poor governance of water reservoirs in the Mazandaran province which presents a major 
challenge in insuring a secure water supply and support of rice production.  
A number of studies have explored the management process seeking different water resources, as well as strategies 
for their improvement, especially regarding the groundwater in Iran. For example, Nazari et al. (2018) conducted 
research on the factors that affect planning, designing, and implementing water management agendas in the Moghan 
Plain, in Northwest Iran by applying SWOT. The results of the SWOT analysis showed 40 critical factors that 
influence irrigation water management in the research area. They found that the highest priorities in the weaknesses 
factors are: ‘failure to establish co-operative water management institutions’, ‘poor social capital’, and ‘low 
effectiveness of extension services’. In the threats factors, ‘limited control over groundwater abstraction’ should be 
considered as one of the key drivers for inefficient irrigation water management, followed by ‘populist actions of 
decision makers’ and ‘declining water resources and land subsidence’. The opportunities factors showed that 
‘promotion of agro-based industries’, ‘improving rural tourism’, and ‘improvement of water markets’ have the 
highest priority. Finally, the strength factor with the highest priority is ‘diversification of agricultural products and 
incomes’, followed by ‘considering food security as a national priority’ and ‘planning for the development of 
resilient water management system’. Based on the PESTLE analysis, they concluded that legal, social, technological 
and political factors are major reasons for the failure of irrigation water management in the research area. They also 
provided a set of strategies to solve the present water problems and rehabilitate the failed schemes in the agriculture 
sector by the TOWS matrix. Re-thinking the role of the development of intensive agriculture, along with raising the 
awareness and attitude of decision makers towards the risks of shortsighted water resource development plans, and 
the promotion of agro-based industries and developing integrated plans to improve water efficiency are strategies to 
improve management of irrigation water in Iran. 
Moridi (2017) by using the DPSIR framework highlighted the fact that climate change and periodic droughts can 
worsen the quantity and quality of water resources in Iran. However, the water crisis in Iran is mainly due to human 
activities and mismanagement such as limited power of government in controlling water withdrawal and pollution 
sources, uneven distribution of the population and economic activities, inadequate monitoring of pollution sources, 
lack of suitable co-operation among relevant governmental and non-governmental organizations, and inadequate 
guidelines and standards.  
Jafary and Bradley (2017) in their study analyzed main challenges in groundwater irrigation management and 
practices in Kashan, Central Iran from the perspective of local farmers. They argued that the government introduces 
water scarcity problems mainly in technological-related issues, while the challenges in local social, cultural, and 
biophysical context are more important. According to their research, the main challenges are management transfer, 
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inappropriate technological solutions, and incompatibility of proposed irrigation schemes with the biophysical, 
social-cultural and economic status of the region. The result of their research showed that local knowledge and 
solutions are ignored when making management decisions and that water management should be developed by 
engaging farmers as key stakeholders. By considering social and cultural factors in water management and 
recognizing barriers of farmers’ participation in government programmes, it would be possible to develop a more 
integrated approach to irrigation management.  They concluded that the government shouldn’t be as a final arbitrator 
for groundwater irrigation management and collaborative efforts among different actors are necessary. 
Mirnezami et al. (2018) explored why local communities in the Rafsanjan Plain in Southern Iran have been inactive 
in the conservation and management of groundwater, although they have experienced successful community-based 
management in the past. They explained that according to the law, people have no power to intervene in the 
management and decision-making process and the government is responsible for all planning, monitoring, 
implementing, and controlling. The unilateral illusory solutions and decisions made by the government have 
destructive impacts on collective action in groundwater resources management. They found that corruption and 
inequity are also critical factors which lead to chaos in groundwater management. Nabavi (2018) addressed the key 
aspects which cause mismanagement of groundwater at the national level and over-abstraction at the local level. 
These challenges are rapid population changes, policy myopia, government’s technological and infrastructural biases 
in future thinking, pro-agricultural investment and subsidies of rural public goods, self-sufficiency rhetoric, lack of 
robust water accounting and measurement, lack of participation and deliberation at local levels in the process of law- 
and policymaking, lack of understanding of the incentives and local actors’ behavior,  overlooking indigenous water 
knowledge, and lax enforcement. Vosoughi and Mohammadi (2013) in their research on the management of Ab-
bandans reported that the government is the main actor and decision-maker in the management process which leads 
to the elimination of interaction among villagers. They found that the socio-economic balance of communities and 
collective management for irrigating rice fields has been eliminated due to government intervention in the use of the 
potential of Ab-bandans. 
Although many studies have been done on water resources in different regions of Iran, there is little evidence on Ab-
bandans in the Mazandaran province. Since water management is highly dependent on context, comprehensive 
research on Ab-bandans, with respect to all related actors, is necessary in order to achieve an effective governance of 
Ab-bandans. It is essential to recognize the public governance challenges in terms of political, institutional and 
administrative rules, practices, and processes and to consider appropriate management strategies and solutions to 
improve the related challenges in the governance of Ab-bandans. Furthermore, it is crucial to integrate local 
stakeholders’ perspectives in the governance of Ab-bandans. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to provide 
empirically supported information on the governance of water reservoirs in Northern Iran from the public and private 
actors perspective at the regional level, as well as stakeholders at the local level, to reflect on their respective roles 
within the governance system which is useful in planning for effective utilization and maintenance of Ab-bandans 
(Fig. 1).  
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 Fig. 1. General structure of the research  
1.3 Objectives and research questions 
1.3.1 General objective 
The overall purpose of this study is to investigate the governance of water reservoirs in Northern Iran, and 
particularly in the Mazandaran province, from the perspective of public and private sectors at the regional level, as 
well as local stakeholders within the communities. Conducting research related to improving water governance in the 
Iranian context could raise awareness of water sustainability challenges and help decision makers to rehabilitate the 
failed schemes for water utilization and conservation. 
1.3.2 Specific objectives and research questions  
In order to reach the overall purpose, the following research questions and objectives are considered:  
Question 1: What are the key gaps in the public governance of Ab-bandans at the regional level in the current 
situation with a focus on the OECD's Multi-level Governance Framework? 
Objectives: 1) Identifying gaps in Ab-bandans governance, 2) Classifying the gaps into categories by applying the 
‘Multi-level Governance Framework’, 3) Prioritizing the gaps in each category, and 4) Prioritizing the categories. 
Question 2: What water policy instruments are necessary to overcome the gaps and improve the public governance of 
Ab-bandans? 
Objectives: 1) Identifying policy instruments for the improvement of the governance of Ab-bandans; 2) Clustering 
these instruments on three OECD reinforcing dimensions of water governance; 3) Assessing how and to what extent 
the instruments grouped in each dimension contribute to the improvement of the governance of Ab-bandans.  
Question 3: How and why components of social capital among various local stakeholders influence the water 
reservoirs-related interactions within the communities. 
Objectives: 1) Identifying key components of social capital among local stakeholders of Ab-bandans; 2) 
Investigating how these components of social capital affect and relate to the governance of Ab-bandans. 
Governance of 
Ab-bandans 
Public water governance  
(at the regional level) Water governance at the local level  
From perspective of government agencies 
related to water management at the regional 
level as well as the private sector  
From perspective of stakeholders at the local 
level  
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1.4 Description of the study area 
1.4.1 Mazandaran Province  
Iran is located between latitudes 25° and 40° N, and longitudes 44° and 63° E (Abbaspour et al., 2009) and has a 
total area of 1,640,195 km2, which is divided into 30 provinces (Karandish et al., 2018). The annual average 
precipitation is 244 mm, but the south-eastern parts of the country (Sistan and Balouhestan provinces) receive much 
less precipitation (104 mm) than northern parts (Mazandaran, Gilan, and Golestan provinces) (1033 mm) (Karandish 
et al., 2018). The present study is conducted in the Mazandaran province of Northern Iran. This province is located 
on the southern Caspian coasts and central regions of the Alborz highlands in northern Iran with an area 23,842 km2 
(Gholami et al., 2010; Sarvi et al., 2016). This study area is located between latitude 35° 46' and 36° 58' north and 
longitude 50° 21 and 54° 8' east (Fig. 2) and it is bordered clockwise by the Golestan, Semnan, and Tehran provinces 
(Shahbazi and Esmaeili-Sari, 2009). Mazandaran is geographically divided into two parts: The coastal plains and a 
mountainous area with an average temperature of 25° C in summer and 6° C in winter (Shahbazi and Esmaeili-Sari, 
2009). The average annual precipitation in the region is 749.9 mm which ranges from more than 1000 mm in the 
west to 300 mm in the east of the province. About 33% of all precipitation falls as snow in the mountainous area and 
the snowmelt period usually begins in mid-April and continues until late April to early May (Nosrati, 2011). 
Precipitation occurs mainly in the wet period, with a maximum quantity in November and December (Shahbazi and 
Esmaeili-Sari, 2009). All rivers in the region originate in the Alborz Mountains, south of the study area (Nosrati, 
2011). With 37% (199,000 ha) of the land under rice cultivation, the Mazandaran Province is the main rice 
production region in the country (Ministry of Agriculture Iran, 2015; Nosrati, 2011). The population of the province 
has been steadily growing during the last 50 years. According to the census of 1996, the population of the province 
was 2,602,008 of which 45.89% were registered as urban dwellers and 54.1% as villagers (Shahbazi and Esmaeili-
Sari, 2009).  
Fig. 2. The location of study area 
Adopted from Soleimani et al. (2019) 
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1.4.2 The concept of Ab-bandan 
Ab-bandans are man-made water storage reservoirs of different sizes ranging from 3 to 1000 hectares and generally 
do not have any geometrical shapes (Abbasian et al., 2014). They were typically constructed by local farmers about 
3000 years ago, by digging the land and compressing the soil to construct a wall around the excavated pond; this was 
based on available materials and indigenous engineering knowledge (Fig. 3) (Ejlali et al., 2012; Ghoddousi, 1999; 
Rahimi Farahani et al., 2012). Ab-bandans are used by local farmers to store water during rainy seasons, for rice 
farming and the livelihoods of local people are dependent on these water reservoirs (Rahimi Farahani et al., 2012). 
Ab-bandans have various functions, of which the water supply for rice cultivation is the most important. Other 
functions are: recharging underground water and wells, collecting drainage water, aquaculture, habitat for birds and 
plants, and the provision of leisure areas (Vosoughi and Mohammadi, 2013). There is an estimated total of 880 Ab-
bandans in the Mazandaran province with an area of around 17,000 hectares, and depths varying from 1.5 m to 4 m 
(Mazandaran Regional Water Authority, 2016). As shown in Fig. 4, they are distributed throughout 13 counties in 
the Mazandaran province.  
The total area under rice cultivation in Iran is estimated as 539,000 hectares. The Mazandaran province with 37% 
(199,000 hectares) under rice cultivation has the highest rank of rice production in the country, and 41.73% of this 
staple food is produced in this province (Ministry of Agriculture Iran, 2016). Ab-bandans supply 331 million m3 of 
water for 51,736 hectares of rice fields in the province which is a considerable amount in comparison to the volume 
of large dams (304 million m3) in this area (Mazandaran Regional Water Authority, 2016).  
 Fig. 3. Water reservoirs in Mazandaran Province 
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 Fig. 4. Distribution of Ab-bandans in the Mazandaran province 
1.5 Methodology 
This study applied both qualitative and quantitative methods for the collection of empirical data and we employed 
separate methodology for each objective. The first paper reveals water governance gaps with the focus on Ab-
bandans using the ‘OECD's Multi-level Governance Framework’ as a conceptual basis. A modified Delphi technique 
was used to identify these gaps using face-to-face interviews (brainstorming round) and ranking round.  
The Delphi technique is an appropriate tool for collecting information and achieving consensus among a panel of 
experts on a certain issue (Landeta, 2006; Tonni and Oliver, 2013). Dalkey (1969: 415) defined Delphi as, “a rapid 
procedure and efficient way to cream the tops of the heads of a group of knowledgeable people”. Linstone and 
Turoff (1975) described Delphi as a research method for enabling group communication processes among experts so 
that they can participate in research and solve complex problems anonymously. Using the Delphi technique is 
efficient and practical in cases where there is no consensus, knowledge, information or certainty in a research subject 
(Powell, 2003; Giannarou and Zervas, 2014; Hasson et al., 2000). 
The Delphi technique is carried out with the participation of individuals, who have knowledge and expertise on the 
research subject, as a panel of experts (Adler and Ziglio, 1996; Skulmoski et al., 2007). We used a modified Delphi 
technique, which relied on face-to-face interviews (brainstorming) for the first round in order to collect initial data. 
Based on purposive and snowball sampling, thirty semi-structured, face-to-face interviews were conducted with 
individuals working in public agencies and the private sector pertaining to water management. All the interviews 
were recorded and transcribed verbatim. We reviewed the transcripts to extract gaps in the governance of Ab-
bandans, and 34 different gaps were identified after comparison of similar cases and the removal of duplicates. Then, 
the ‘ranking round’ was conducted to assess consensus among the participants using the gaps provided in the first 
round. A structured questionnaire was designed based on the gaps. We then distributed the questionnaires to the 
participants and asked them to rate the importance of each gap. Ultimately, a high consensus on 29 out of 34 gaps 
was reached. 
The second paper refers to the identification of relevant water policy instruments and assessment of the suitability of 
these multiple instruments in an integrated way to achieve good governance of Ab-bandans. For reaching research 
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purposes, an exploratory sequential design was followed as a mixed methods approach (qualitative and quantitative) 
for the purpose of research. In an exploratory sequential design, qualitative data is first collected and analyzed, and 
themes are used to drive the development of a quantitative instrument i.e. questionnaire to further explore the 
research problems (Berman, 2017). In the qualitative phase, we used semi-structured, face-to-face interviews to 
collect qualitative data. Interviews were conducted with individuals who work in public agencies and private 
companies pertaining to water management at the regional level. Initially, we applied purposive sampling, starting 
with eight interviewees who were known to the researchers. Then, we asked them to suggest other possible interview 
partners. Finally, 30 people were asked to answer the main questions regarding different instruments and strategies 
required for improving the governance of Ab-bandans and overcoming related barriers. All the interviews were 
recorded and transcribed verbatim. We reviewed the transcripts to extract policy instruments for the improvement of 
the governance of Ab-bandans, and 31 different policy instruments were identified. Ultimately, the instruments 
identified were clustered and grouped according to three reinforcing OECD dimensions of water governance 
(effectiveness, efficiency, trust and engagement) (OECD, 2015). The results from the qualitative phase were applied 
to build a questionnaire for the quantitative phase. Afterwards, we distributed the questionnaires to a large sample of 
participants through snowball sampling and asked them to rate the importance of each policy instrument to improve 
the governance of Ab-bandans. A Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was conducted to analyze the quantitative 
data. This was useful for the assessment of how and to what extent the policy instruments identified can logically and 
systematically represent three reinforcing dimensions of the governance of Ab-bandans. Based on the CFA, 28 out of 
31 policy instruments were identified which would contribute to the improvement of the governance of Ab-bandans. 
The third paper explores aspects of social capital in the governance of Ab-bandans, seeking explanations as to how 
and why components of social capital among various local stakeholders, influence the water reservoirs-related 
interactions within the communities. The qualitative method was applied to achieve the purpose of research. Semi-
structured, face-to-face interviews were conducted with a range of local key stakeholders of Ab-bandans i.e. farmers, 
fishermen, informal leaders (elders, Mirab, farmers’ representatives), and official leaders (members of rural 
councils). Interviews are about listening to and gaining an understanding of people’s stories, and the individual 
participant’s life experience. Indeed, interviewees can express the viewpoint of participants, in private, without a 
framework imposed by the researcher (Bolderston, 2012). Interviews initially began with a set of stakeholders who 
were known to the researchers (i.e. purposive sampling), and then a snowball sampling approach was used to identify 
additional interviewees, who also had experience, ability, and readiness to provide the required data. Ultimately, 29 
local stakeholders were interviewed and all the interviews were transcribed verbatim. NVivo was used to code the 
transcripts through the identification of relevant themes, concepts, ideas, and relationships.  
Chapter 1. Introduction 
12 
1.6 Theoretical framework of the study 
Early thinking about water governance was based on highly centralized systems that emphasized the role of 
government in water management (Cooley et al., 2013). Today, however, water governance refers to “the range of 
political, institutional and administrative rules, practices, and processes (formal and informal) through which 
decisions are taken and implemented, stakeholders can articulate their interests and have their concerns considered, 
and decision-makers are held accountable for water management” (OECD, 2015: 5). Rogers and Hall (2003: 7) 
described water governance as “a range of political, social, economic and administrative systems that are in place to 
develop and manage water resources and the delivery of water services at different levels of society”.  
OECD (2011) reported that the water crisis is a governance crisis, which includes: fragmented institutional 
structures, multiple and interdependent stakeholders across levels of government, lack of capacity of sub-national 
governments, weak institutional, integrity and regulatory frameworks and patchy financial management. It means 
that formulating and implementing the water-related policies requires not only the engagement of society, but also 
involvement of political and administrative organizations at different levels. In order to govern water, all authorities, 
whether regional, state or national authorities, and even international organizations have to work together in harmony 
(Akhmouch and Correia, 2016). Therefore, public water governance as a political, institutional, and administrative 
framework for integrated water resources management, through a range of public actors across ministries, 
departments and public agencies, and various levels of government plays a critical role in providing incentives to 
different groups of users to engage in water-sustainable practices (OECD, 2011). Rogers (2006: 17) pointed out that 
“governance aspects overlap with the technical and economic aspects of water, but governance points us to the 
political and administrative elements of solving a problem or exploiting an opportunity”.  
Understanding the difficulties in public water governance and its contribution to effective design and implementation 
of water policies, and better managing relations across all levels of government is now considered a prerequisite for 
achieving water security (OECD, 2011). The OECD ‘Multi-level Governance Framework’ (OECD, 2011) can be a 
powerful diagnostic tool in order to reveal gaps in public water governance. This analytical framework is a 
diagnostic tool for policy makers to distinguish and anticipate common gaps hindering water governance. The OECD 
Multi-level Governance Framework identified seven categories of governance gaps in the water sector which are 
relevant to all countries regardless of their institutional organization, water availability and demand, and degree of 
decentralization (OECD, 2011). It used several perception and fact-based indicators to assess the performance of 
water governance in 17 OECD member countries (OECD, 2011) and 13 Latin American countries (OECD, 2012), as 
well as focusing more at the national level in the case of Mexico (2013), Netherlands (2014a), Jordan (2014b), 
Tunisia (2014c), and Brazil (2015b). It is also used to analyze the analytical background water governance in cities 
(2016), stakeholder engagement (2015), and integrity (2014d). Seven categories of water governance gaps are 
presented in Fig. 5 and Table 1. Taking everything into account, the first objective of this research (corresponding 1rd 
paper) refers to understanding key gaps in public governance of Ab-bandans in the Mazandaran province, from the 
perspective of a range of actors across government agencies related to water management at the regional level as 
well as private actors (i.e. private firms) who are involved in the water-related planning and decision-making.  
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 Fig. 5. Water governance gaps 
 Adopted from Akhmouch and Correia (2016) 
 Table 1 Seven key gaps hindering water governance 
Description Gap 
Overlapping, unclear allocation of roles and responsibilities Policy gap 
Mismatch between hydrological and administrative boundaries Administrative gap 
Asymmetries of information between central and sub-national 
governments Information gap 
Lack of technical capacity, staff, time, knowledge and infrastructure Capacity gap 
Unstable or insufficient revenues of sub-national governments to 
effectively implement water policies Funding gap 
Intensive competition between different ministries Objective gap 
Lack of citizen concern about water policy and low involvement of 
water users’ associations Accountability gap 
 Adopted from OECD (2011) 
There is a need to bridge the gaps of public water governance in order to achieve water security; OECD (2015) 
suggested a set of policy instruments and good practices for overcoming these gaps in the water sector. OECD 
(2015) has formulated 12 principles to assist governments at all levels to strengthen water governance to suit current 
and future water challenges. These principles seek to enhance water governance and manage “too much”, “too little” 
and “too polluted” water in a sustainable, integrated, and inclusive manner with acceptable costs and reasonable 
time-frames (Akhmouch and Correia, 2016). These principles were developed by the OECD Water Governance 
Initiative, a multi-stakeholder platform of over 100 delegates from public, private, and non-profit sectors to scale up 
governance responses to water challenges. A preliminary step to developing these principles consisted in preparing 
an inventory of tools, guidelines, and principles on water governance to take stock of what already exists. This 
document comprises 108 governance tools among which 55 are specific to the water sector. These principles were 
grouped into three dimensions (i.e. effectiveness, efficiency, trust and engagement) and approved by the OECD 
Regional Development Policy Committee through a written procedure on 11 May 2015 (OECD, 2015) (Fig. 6).  
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Water governance is good, if it can help to solve key water challenges through using a combination of bottom-up and 
top-down processes, while fostering constructive state-society relations (Akhmouch and Correia, 2016; OECD, 
2015). “Governance is bad if instead of focusing on solving problems effectively and efficiently, it ends up 
generating unnecessary bureaucracy with the corresponding transaction costs and ultimately not responding to the 
real place-based needs” (Akhmouch and Correia, 2016: 18). Based on this, the second objective (corresponding 2rd 
paper) takes a close look at relevant policy instruments and practices which could be applied by public authorities for 
solving challenges and improving the governance of Ab-bandans.  
Fig. 6. Overview of the principles and three mutually reinforcing OECD dimensions 
of water governance. Adopted from OECD (2015) and Akhmouch and Correia (2016)
Effective and good water governance is not only related to the decisions of water managers and administrators to 
solve the water problems of today and in future, but also addresses how societies can manage their water resources in 
a wise manner (Hoekstra, 2011). Governance refers to all processes of governing undertaken, not only by the 
government, but also by informal institutions such as families, tribes, or local communities (Bevir, 2013). Therefore, 
water governance at the local level considers the capability of various social stakeholders to manage water resources 
in a collective manner (Solanes and Jouravlev, 2006). Kelly et al. (2017) argued that social capital is an important 
factor, which facilitates collective interaction of the local community for the governance and conversation of water 
resources. There are stronger possibilities of enhancing collaborative governance of natural resource management at 
the local level when social capital is forthcoming within the communities e.g. trust, reciprocity, and cooperation 
(Musavengane and Simatele, 2016). Musavengane (2019) mentioned that challenges of social capital, which mainly 
influences collaborative environmental management at the community level, are: power structure, the exclusion of 
stakeholders in decision making, lack of feedback, lack of transparency, lack of trust, and divergent interests. There 
is no doubt that, in order to find sustainable solutions to the water crisis, the issues of community co-operation and 
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empowerment in water resource management have to be promoted (Tantoh and Simatele, 2017). Musavengane 
(2019: 46) argued that “community participation is at the heart of environmental governance, as it facilitates and 
promotes a sense of ownership in any decision making and social development issues of a society”. Lopez-Gunn 
(2003) pointed out that farmer self-governance in the management of water resources is based on key principles such 
as participation, adequate level of action, and empowerment. Therefore, in the third objective (corresponding 3rd 
paper), five central components of social capital i.e. trust, co-operation, social network cohesion, leaders and their 
roles, and conflict resolution mechanisms are used to examine how social capital can be implemented as an 
instrument for promoting collective interaction among local stakeholders for self-governance of Ab-bandans. Fig. 7 
illustrates schematically the general framework in this dissertation.  
Fig. 7. General structure of the research objectives 
1.7 Outline of the dissertation 
This dissertation consists of three papers which are based on the research objectives. All three papers have been 
submitted to reputable international peer-reviewed journals, two of which have been published. These papers form 
the basis of this cumulative Ph.D. dissertation. The current Chapter (Chapter 1) includes: introduction, research 
problem, research questions and objectives, and theoretical framework), Chapter 2, 3, and 4 present these three 
papers. The first and second papers have already been published in the Journal of “Environmental Science and 
Policy” and “Agricultural Water Management”, respectively. The third paper has been submitted to the “Human 
Ecology”. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes with a summary of the main results and discussion, limitations, significance 
and contribution of the research, and policy recommendations for the improvement of the governance of water 
reservoirs in Northern Iran. Fig. 8 summarises the outline of this cumulative Ph.D. dissertation.   
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A B S T R A C T
The amount of rainfall in Mazandaran province of Northern Iran is high. Mazandaran has man-made water
reservoirs called Ab-bandan, to collect rainfall for irrigating rice farms during the growing seasons. However, rice
farms face water scarcity because only a small amount of rainfall is being stored in Ab-bandans, while either the
remaining water runs off into the sea, or causes water-logging or flooding. This research addresses Ab-bandans
governance gaps in the Mazandaran province, using the ‘Multi-level Governance Framework’ introduced by the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). A modified Delphi technique with face-to-
face interviews and a ranking round is used to identify Ab-bandans governance gaps. The identified gaps are
classified into seven categories by applying the OECD's framework. In each of the categories there is one most
important gap: the lack of a specific law for Ab-bandans, lack of long-term and strategic planning, low re-
cognition of Ab-bandans at the national level, insufficient budget, lack of water user associations, lack of research
in practice, and lack of using technology. The findings show that lack of a specific law for Ab-bandans in the
country's water law is the most acute gap of all. In addition, the analysis highlights the fact that the policy
category is the most critical one. The identified gaps are interlinked and exacerbate each other, therefore, a
holistic perspective is needed to understand and resolve them. This study recommends a reform in the country’s
water law, improved linkage between levels of government, co-operation among organizations involved in Ab-
bandans management, and participation of local stakeholders in planning.
1. Introduction
Water is the main component required for the production of food
supplies to feed the increasing population (Kumar, 2003). The key
message of the International Federation of Agricultural Producers
(IFAP) (2005: 3) is “without water, there is no agriculture and therefore
no food security”. Consequently, water conservation and efficient use of
water resources are the main challenges in the 21st century (Samian
et al., 2015).
Iran is a semi-arid country with an average annual rainfall of ap-
proximately 250 mm. However, due to the adjacent Caspian Sea and
mountain ranges of Alborz, the amount of rainfall in Mazandaran
province of Northern Iran is exceptionally high, with an average annual
rainfall of 749.9 mm (Ministry of Energy Iran, 2015; Modarres, 2006).
Moreover, 37% (199,000 ha) of the land in Mazandaran is used for rice
cultivation, which is the staple food in Iran (Ministry of Agriculture
Iran, 2016).
In Mazandaran, there is a ‘traditional water harvesting system’
called Ab-bandan (Ghoddousi, 1999). In fact, Ab-bandans are man-made
‘water reservoirs’ or ‘artificial wetland’ with different sizes ranging
from 3 to 1000 ha (Abbasian et al., 2014). The main purpose of these
water reservoirs is the collection of rainfall during the rainy seasons
(autumn and winter) for irrigating rice farms during the growing sea-
sons (spring and summer) (Abbasian et al., 2014). However, rice farms
face water scarcity during the growing seasons as less than 10% of
rainfall is being stored in Ab-bandans. The remaining water either runs
off into the sea through rivers and streams, or causes water-logging or
flooding, which reduce soil fertility and negatively affects the rice
production (Ministry of Agriculture Iran, 2016). This leads to the
question: why do rice farms in the rainy province of Iran encounter
water stress although Ab-bandans have a huge potential to harvest the
rainfall and drainage water?
As stated by the Second World Water Forum in the Netherlands
“Water crisis is mainly a crisis of governance” (GWP, 2000: 16). The
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water crisis is not due to water shortage because sufficient water exists
for all people, even in areas where there is a temporary shortage of
water. It is caused by the mismanagement and public governance crises
(OECD, 2011). Moreover, Madani (2014) underlined that water scarcity
in Iran is rooted in managerial, political, and institutional challenges
rather than engineering and technical issues and that the country is
suffering from challenges in the water governance. This draws attention
to the factors hindering effective governance in the case of Ab-bandans.
Using the ‘Multi-level Governance Framework’ (OECD, 2011) as a
conceptual basis, this study identifies water governance gaps with the
focus on Ab-bandans in the Mazandaran province of Northern Iran.
Identifying the gaps could provide input for policy-makers in order to
prioritize options to strengthen Ab-bandans governance.
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on water govern-
ance by: 1) Identifying gaps in Ab-bandans governance; 2) Classifying
the gaps into categories by applying the ‘Multi-level Governance
Framework’; 3) Prioritizing the gaps in each category; and 4)
Prioritizing the categories. The paper is structured as follows: The
theoretical background is discussed in Section 2; the research area and
Ab-bandans characteristics are described in Section 3; followed by the
methodology in Section 4; Results and discussion in Section 5; and
Conclusion in Section 6.
2. Theoretical background
Food security plays a significant role in the national security of a
country and nowadays providing food security is the most serious
challenge for human society (Kang et al., 2017; Meskhia, 2016). The
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) emphasized that food se-
curity without water security cannot be achieved (Bertilsson, 2012).
Water management is the main component of water security in the
agricultural sector and is necessary for the achievement of food security
by increasing the production of three stable foods i.e. wheat, maize, and
rice in the world (USAID, 2015).
The United Nations introduced integrated water resource manage-
ment in the late 1990s as an ecosystem-based approach. This approach
considers the relationship among natural resource systems, biophysical
processes, and socio-economic systems as a whole for water manage-
ment (UNDP, 2004). Implementing integrated water management
needs a new approach with significant changes in existing interactions
between politics, laws, regulations, institutions, private sector, and civil
society, which lead to the formation of the concept of water governance
(Rogers and Hall, 2003).
Water governance includes processes, actors, and institutions in-
volved in making decisions for development and management of water
resources as well as water service delivery in political, social, economic,
and administrative dimensions at different levels (international, na-
tional, and regional) (FAO, 2014; GWP, 2000; Rogers and Hall, 2003).
According to OECD (2015a: 5), water governance is “the range of po-
litical, institutional and administrative rules, practices, and processes
(formal and informal) through which decisions are taken and im-
plemented, stakeholders can articulate their interests and have their
concerns considered, and decision-makers are held accountable for
water management”.
OECD (2015a) clarified water governance as good governance if it
applies a combination of bottom-up and top-down processes to resolve
water challenges while fostering constructive state-society relations.
However, bad governance causes increasing social and political risks,
institutional failure, and reduces the capacity to deal with related
problems (Rogers and Hall, 2003).
Addressing governance challenges in water policies is crucial in
terms of achievement of ‘right’ governance in the water sector (OECD,
2011; Tropp, 2007). The Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) identified governance gaps in water policies by
applying the ‘Multi-level Governance Framework’. OECD (2011) stated
that a multi-level approach is required for water governance because
the water sector involves a multiplicity of political and administrative
organizations at different levels i.e. local, regional, national, interna-
tional, and in addition, citizens, private actors, end users, service pro-
viders, etc.
This analytical framework is a guideline for policy-makers in all
countries in order to distinguish public governance gaps regardless of
the institutional setting (OECD, 2011). It has already been employed in
17 OECD member countries (OECD, 2011) and 13 Latin American
countries (OECD, 2012), as well as focusing more at the national level
in the case of Mexico (2013), Netherlands (2014a), Jordan (2014b),
Tunisia (2014c), and Brazil (2015b).
The OECD's framework categorizes water governance gaps into
seven categories (policy, administrative, information, accountability,
objective, funding, and capacity):
1) The policy category is due to fragmentation of roles and responsi-
bilities in the water-related policies. Water policy coherence relies
on institutional settings and allocation of tasks at the different levels
of government.
2) The administrative category refers to the mismatch between ad-
ministrative zones and territorial organizations. This gap deters in-
tegrated and territorially customized planning for effective water
management. The type and number of public agencies involved in
the water-related processes are also elements, which should be ad-
dressed in the administrative category.
3) The information category includes a weakness in producing in-
formation and the inability of governments to share the existing
water data. Moreover, this category indicates that most govern-
ments are suffering from the scattering of the water data across
ministries and agencies.
4) The accountability category is generated when governments are not
able to provide transparent and trustable evidence in water policy
performance. Ensuring accountability is not possible without the
monitoring of procedures and actions by governments and citizen
participation.
5) The objective category is about the unclear objectives of water
governance and conflicts among them in the context of economic,
social, and environmental issues.
6) The funding category addresses a lack of sufficient budget to be able
to undertake required activities for water management such as the
construction and maintenance of infrastructure.
7) The capacity category is considered to be the insufficient knowl-
edge, lack of human resources, and obsolete infrastructure and
technology.
3. Research area description and Ab-bandans characteristics
Mazandaran Province with an area of 24.000 km2 (1.46% of the
total area of Iran) is one of the green provinces in the Northern plateau
of Iran adjacent to the Caspian Sea. The climate of the area is divided
into two parts: Mountainous and moderate (Kheyroddin and
Hedayatifard, 2017; Khoshbakht and Hammer, 2006).
Ab-bandans are constructed by digging the land and compressing the
soil to construct a wall around the excavated pond for collecting water
during the rainy seasons (Ejlali et al., 2012). There are 880 Ab-bandans
in Mazandaran with an area of around 17,000 ha and depths varying
from 1.5 m to 4 m (Mazandaran Regional Water Authority, 2016). Al-
though accurate information on the history of Ab-bandans is not avail-
able, it is assumed that they are 3000 years old (Kamali and Mahdiyan,
2001; Rahimi Farahani et al., 2012).
The potential for storing water in Ab-bandans is 331 million m3,
which is a considerable amount in comparison to the volume of large
dams (304 million m3) in this area (Mazandaran Regional Water
Authority, 2016). Although the main purpose of these water reservoirs
is the storage of water for rice cultivation, they also play an important
role in recharging underground water and wells, collecting drainage
A. Mirzaei et al. Environmental Science and Policy 77 (2017) 98–106
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water, aquaculture, habitat for birds and plants, attracting tourism,
creating jobs, and preventing the migration of rural people to the cities
(Salabi, 2010) (Fig. 1).
4. Methodology
This study aims to reveal Ab-bandans governance gaps in the
Mazandaran province of Northern Iran by applying a Delphi technique.
Originally the Delphi technique was developed by Dalaki, Helmer, and
Ryshr at the RAND Corporation (Santa Monica, California) in the 1950s
for forecasting technological issues in the future (Hasson et al., 2000;
Keeney et al., 2011). The classical Delphi technique is defined “to gain
consensus through a series of rounds of questionnaire surveys (usually
two or three), where information and results are fed back to panel
members between each round” (Hanafin, 2004: 4). Rowe and Wright
(1999) characterized the classical Delphi technique by the anonymity of
Delphi participants, iteration, controlled feedback, and statistical ag-
gregation of group responses.
The Delphi technique has been commonly utilized in a broad range
of research when the purpose of a study is to forecast, develop, identify,
and validate the subject under investigation (Skulmoski et al., 2007).
This approach is appropriate when there is contradictory information,
uncertainty or lack of knowledge on a subject (Giannarou and Zervas,
2014; Hasson et al., 2000; Powell, 2003). As the Delphi technique is “a
rapid and efficient way to cream the tops of the heads of a group of
knowledgeable people” (Dalkey, 1969: 415), this technique was con-
sidered to be suitable to identify Ab-bandans governance gaps.
The Delphi technique is carried out with the participation of in-
dividuals as a panel of experts who have knowledge and expertise on
the research subject (Adler and Ziglio, 1996; Skulmoski et al., 2007). In
our case, persons who are working in public organizations and the
private sector pertaining to Ab-bandans were selected as Delphi parti-
cipants (see Fig. 2).
Although different stakeholders at the local level e.g., farmers,
farmers’ representatives, fishermen, and local officials play an equally
important role in Ab-bandans governance, this paper focuses on the
public water governance. Therefore, we addressed the public actors at
the regional level. Additionally, we considered private actors who in-
fluence public governance issues.
We used purposive and snowball sampling to select the Delphi
participants and started with eight candidates who one researcher
knew. A consent form, invitation letter, and a study information sheet
were given to the candidates in person. This documentation included
information on the research topic and objective, description of the
OECD's water governance gaps, and the approximate total time span
required for the research. Additionally, we asked for other possible
candidates and finally, 30 people agreed to act as Delphi participants.
We used a modified Delphi technique, which implied having face-to-
face interviews for the first round (Davidson, 2013). The collection of
qualitative data through interviews helps to ensure the content validity
and a more reliable conclusion by triangulation (Atieno, 2009). More-
over, the individual ranking is vital to assess consensus among panel
members (Schmidt, 1997). Therefore, we employed a ‘ranking-type’ of
modified Delphi techniques which generally involves three rounds:
Brainstorming, Narrowing-down, and Ranking (El-Gazzar et al., 2016;
Poba-Nzaou et al., 2016; Schmidt et al., 2001). In our case, the ‘Nar-
rowing-down Round’ was skipped (Poba-Nzaou et al., 2016) since the
number of extracted gaps from the first round was manageable for the
next round (El-Gazzar et al., 2016). As shown in Fig. 3, the modified
Delphi technique was conducted in two rounds as follow:
In the ‘Brainstorming Round’, we used ‘semi-structured face-to-face’
interviews (Delbari et al., 2016; Hasson et al., 2000; Lai et al., 2015)
with 30 participants in order to collect initial data and to attract
maximum participation. The average time of interviews was 60 min
(45–75 min). We conducted the interviews in the form of dialogue using
probing questions based on the OECD's water governance gaps to create
a guideline for the interviewees to make deeper consideration regarding
Ab-bandans governance gaps.
Fig. 1. Geographical location of the research area.
Adopted from: http://www.d-maps.com
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All the interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. To
confirm the credibility and rigor of the interviews, a copy of the tran-
scripts was returned to the participants for their approval. Therefore,
the majority of participants were involved in the interpretive process of
the initial data and this improved mutual understanding. We reviewed
the transcripts to extract Ab-bandans governance gaps and we identified
34 different gaps after combining similar cases and removing dupli-
cates.
Then, we conducted the ‘Ranking Round’ to assess consensus among
the participants on the gaps provided in the brainstorming round. A
structured questionnaire was designed based on the gaps with a five-
point Likert scale (from very low = 1 to very high = 5). Afterwards, we
distributed the questionnaires to the participants and asked them to
rate the importance of each gap.
We applied the Standard Deviation (SD) to estimate the level of
consensus among the participants (Duncan et al., 2008; Rayens and
Hahn, 2000; Schmidt, 1997). The level of consensus is high if SD is
equal or smaller than one (Henning and Jordaan, 2016). The results of
ranking round showed that a high consensus was reached on 29 out of
34 gaps. It is necessary to note that the results are ‘participants’ con-
sensus’, and that does not mean ‘best’ or ‘correct’ responses have been
found. However, in order to illustrate these aggregated consensus gaps,
we make use of selected quotations from the interviews in the results
section, indicating the interviewee with a participant’s number.
Achieving a consensus is not meaningful if researchers do not con-
sider stability/internal reliability of responses (Von der Gracht, 2012).
Stability of responses means “the proportional consistency of variance
among raters” (Murphy et al., 1998: 60). The Wilcoxon Signed-Rank
test is appropriate to examine the stability of responses (Poba-Nzaou
et al., 2016; Trevelyan and Robinson, 2015; Von der Gracht, 2012). To
determine the stability of responses, the ranking round was repeated
with the consensus gaps. The Wilcoxon test indicated that there is no
significant difference between the responses of the first and second
ranking for 24 out of 29 gaps. This means that the results are stable and
reliable.
Further analysis was done by ordering the consensus gaps into the
seven categories of OECD's water governance gaps; in addition, we used
the Mean to show the priority in each category to determine the more
acute gaps. Ultimately, the Friedman test was applied to rank the ca-
tegories.
5. Findings and discussion
Table 1 indicates Ab-bandans governance gaps in the seven cate-
gories of OECD's water governance gaps and the Mean shows the
priority of gaps in each category. The following subsections include a
discussion of each of the gaps.
Fig. 2. Key actors in Ab-bandans governance at the
regional level.
Fig. 3. Consecutive steps of the modified Delphi technique.
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5.1. Policy category
The lack of a specific law for Ab-bandans is the most acute gap
(M = 4.92), not only in the policy category but also in all the gaps
identified. The majority of participants mentioned that there is no legal
status for Ab-bandans because they are just restricted to Northern Iran.
They explained that underground water resources (called Qanat) could
be found in most parts of Iran but Ab-bandans do not exist anywhere in
the country except in the Northern areas. Document review of the ap-
proved laws by Iran's parliament confirms this result Among approved
laws, there are 12 acts related to the environment and 84 acts related to
the water issue, which have been adopted at the national level.
Examples are the Law on Preserving Groundwater Resources, 1966;
Nationalization of Water Resources Act, 1968; Water Equitable
Distribution Law, 1982; Law on Crop Water Price Fixation, 1990; and
Law on Promotion of Investment in Water Projects, 2002. The above-
mentioned laws do not refer to Ab-bandans and to their regulations.
Another policy gap is the unclear ownership status of Ab-bandans.
“The ownership status of Ab-bandans is not clear and there are no official
documents or evidence to prove legal ownership in villages” (participant
26). Participants believed that farmers upstream and downstream of the
reservoirs, or even users of a common reservoir, claim ownership and
utilization which leads to social conflicts. It seems that the claim to
ownership is due to the uncertainty of the farmers whether they have
reliable access to the water. Subsequently, the use of the water re-
servoirs for other purposes e.g., fishing could be difficult. Bayat et al.
(2015) mentioned that due to lack of clear water rights, increasing
demand for limited water resources causes conflicts and tensions among
different users.
Furthermore, there is no legal support or authority to enforce gen-
eral regulations to prevent farmers from destroying the reservoirs. “Ab-
bandans close to the rice farms with no clear boundary and geometric shape
are gradually being grabbed by farmers” (participants 19, 30). Participants
stated that the economic value of land in Northern Iran is high and this
motivates farmers to enter the boundaries of Ab-bandans. However, the
government does not take trespassing by farmers seriously. As Costa
Barbosa et al. (2016) expressed the absence of authority and commit-
ment by government representatives are the important reasons for
lawlessness.
Another identified policy gap is fragmentation and overlapping of
tasks across organizations involved. “Decision-making and planning pro-
cesses for Ab-bandans are scattered among several organizations” (parti-
cipant 17). Ab-bandans suffer from a sectorial perspective across orga-
nizations involved, and the multiplicity of public actors is not co-
ordinated. Roles and responsibilities are not clearly allocated across
various governmental agencies. Formulation of water policies is more
than finding relevant technical solutions to space, time, quantity,
quality, availability, and water needs (Akhmouch and Correia, 2016).
The first step for water policy reforms would be to arrange ‘compre-
hensive institutional mapping’ in order to understand who decides,
what decisions are made and at which level (OECD, 2011, 2013).
The next gap is “political representatives interfere in the management of
Ab-bandans, for instance; interference in water pricing or budgeting for Ab-
bandans rehabilitation” (participants 22, 30). Participants noted that
political representatives mainly seek influence over the water-related
decision-making and planning with the intent of achieving local and
regional political power and interests. It seems that the water issue is
turning into a political tool in the research area. OECD (2015b) already
mentioned that interference of influential groups is an important
challenge in water governance.
5.2. Objective category
Lack of codified, long-term, and strategic planning at the regional
level is identified as the most important objective gap. “The regional
state does not attempt to prepare a systematic and long-term plan for Ab-
Table 1
Prioritizing Ab-bandans governance gaps in the categories (n = 30).
Category Gaps SD Mean Rank
Policy Lack of a specific law for Ab-bandans 0.37 4.92 1
Fragmentation and overlapping of tasks across organizations involved 0.67 4.64 2
Unclear ownership status of Ab-bandans 0.69 4.50 3
Interference of influential and political individuals 0.70 4.14 4
Lack of legal support or authority to enforce general legislations 0.63 4.03 5
Objective Lack of codified, long-term, and strategic planning at the regional level 0.57 4.46 1
Lack of comprehensive planning for simultaneous use of Ab-bandans functions 0.76 4.07 2
Water issue is not a priority for the central government 0.66 4.00 3
Lack of technical instructions 0.62 3.89 4
Lack of environmental guidelines 0.92 3.42 5
Diverging or contradictory objectives and interests 0.91 3.39 6
Administrative Low recognition of Ab-bandans at the national level 0.59 4.71 1
Lack of a specific agency for Ab-bandans 0.62 4.39 2
Less attention paid to the importance of Ab-bandans compared to dams 0.54 4.17 3
Lack of attention to benefits and potentials of Ab-bandans 0.62 4.10 4
Funding Inadequate funding for Ab-bandans rehabilitation 0.69 4.42 –-
Accountability Lack of water user associations 0.65 4.28 1
Government ignorance of local participation 0.74 3.96 2
Lack of monitoring and evaluating Ab-bandans rehabilitation 0.78 3.78 3
Conflicts between local stakeholders and government 0.76 3.71 4
Corruption in rehabilitation projects 0.61 3.67 5
Unwillingness of farmers to take active participation 0.83 3.50 6
Information Lack of research in practice 0.59 4.14 1
Lack of accurate and clear statistics/information 0.84 3.75 2
Capacity Lack of using technology 0.62 4.10 1
Technical problems 0.54 4.00 2
Lack of farmers’ knowledge and perception toward the water conservation 0.81 4.00 3
Not taking into account the ideas of experts 0.74 3.96 4
Lack of an appropriate extension system 0.70 3.85 5
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bandans” (participant 21). Participants cited that the management of
Ab-bandans is not based on long-term targets and territorialized plan-
ning in consistence with the ecological, economic, and social features,
which are typical for the area. Likewise, integrated planning for si-
multaneous use of various potentials of the reservoirs is being ne-
glected.
It seems that the absence of strategic planning is not restricted to the
water reservoirs in Northern Iran. As two participants highlighted “there
is no comprehensive and long-term approach to deal with the water crisis at
the national level of management and also delay occurs in the enforcement
of general plans” (participants 21, 22). Participants believed that despite
the importance of water, it is not a priority in the country and no broad
and expertise visions exist regarding the water crisis at the national
level. OECD (2011) reported that objective gaps focus on governance
problems in terms of strategic planning and regional development of
water policy. The policies in the water sector should focus mainly on
the long-term actions including pre-evaluation, advisory system, im-
plementation, post-evaluation, stakeholders’ participation, and a time
frame for all activities.
Lack of instructions for designing, exploitation, rehabilitation, and
maintenance of Ab-bandans is considered to be an objective gap.
Participants stated that parameters relevant to the construction and
rehabilitation of other hydraulic structures e.g., dams, cannot be used
for Ab-bandans, and specific parameters regarding the climate condition
and soil type in the area are necessary.
There is also a lack of guidelines on environmental issues. “Urban
and rural rubbish is left around the reservoirs and landfill leachate comes
into the water” (participant 28). Participants believed that pesticide
contamination of the water and rise of non-native plants e.g., water
hyacinth are additional problems, due to the lack of certain environ-
mental guidelines. As might be expected, developing environmental
regulations depends on the extent to which legislators at the national
level are familiar with Ab-bandans and their characteristics. Kjeldsen
et al. (1999) concluded in their study that inattention to environmental
considerations in water policies could be an important risk for sus-
tainable water resource management.
Diverging or contradictory objectives and interests is another ob-
jective gap. “Each organization wants to implement its own policies, ob-
jectives, and perspectives” (participant 19). Participants mentioned that
each organization is aware of its own priorities, but is not willing to
take the priorities of other organizations involved in Ab-bandans man-
amgent into consideration. For instance, the Department of
Environment has opposed dredging because most Ab-bandans are a
habitat for birds and plants, and natural habitats could be destroyed by
dredging. However, dredging is required to increase the water storage
capacity. Thus, coherence planning cannot be approached due to the
contradiction between relevant actors’ decisions. Chereni (2007) be-
lieved that the integration of objectives can only be improved through
relationship and co-ordination between the organizations involved.
5.3. Administrative category
Low recognition of Ab-bandans at the national level is the most
significant administrative gap. “Government and regulatory officials at the
national level are not aware of the local water resources in the Northern
areas” (participants 30, 23). Participants believed that the lack of ac-
curate recognition of Ab-bandans by the central officials might be a
major reason why there is a lack of law for Ab-bandans in the country’s
water law.
Lack of a specific and single agency in charge of Ab-bandans at the
regional level is the next administrative gap, which raises difficulties for
effective management. A number of participants pointed out that the
responsibility for managing the water reservoirs over the years has been
transferred between two organizations: the Agriculture Organization
and the Regional Water Authority. Since their management period is
temporary, they do not tend to design long-term and comprehensive
plans. Saleth and Dinar (1999) said that water administration, as the
hardware ingredient in the water sector will be empowered through law
and policy as the software ingredient for the water sector.
Further administrative gaps include paying too little attention to the
importance of Ab-bandans compared to dams, and the lack of attention
to benefits and potentials of Ab-bandans. “Non-experts recommend con-
struction of dams as a solution for the water crisis due to financial or po-
litical interests without paying attention to the technical and environmental
considerations” (participants 26, 22). Participants believed that Ab-
bandans are small-scale reservoirs based on the indigenous knowledge
of farmers and are compatible with the local ecosystem. A considerable
amount of water can be stored and the cost for their construction and
maintenance is trivial in comparison to dams. Moreover, Ab-bandans
from the perspective of participants have a high level of multi-func-
tionality. Molden et al. (2001) noted that institutions in the water sector
should change their manner from a development of technical solutions
(construction of infrastructure) to enhance the optimum use of water
resources.
5.4. Funding category
“The budget allocated by the government for the rehabilitation of Ab-
bandans is unstable and insignificant considering the high number of Ab-
bandans in the area” (participant 30). Although the rehabilitation of
reservoirs is necessary after several years of use (between 5 and 10
years), according to the participants, the central government does not
allocate sufficient budget due to the low recognition of the water re-
servoirs and lack of regulations for them. Dinar (2000) stressed that a
close relationship exists between financial circumstances and water
service quality.
5.5. Accountability category
Lack of water user associations is the major gap in the account-
ability category. “The government does not attempt to create water user
associations and engage local stakeholders in all stages of decision-making,
planning, construction, exploitation, and maintenance” (participant 28).
The government does not see local participation as an opportunity to
improve the management of Ab-bandans. Since the water reservoirs are
located in villages, attention to the role of local stakeholders is in-
evitable. Yazdanpanah et al. (2013) argued that the current water crisis
in Iran resulted from a top-down process. Policy-makers could consider
participatory water governance and collaborative decision-making as a
part of a more decentralized process. Akhmouch and Correia (2016)
stated that participation of users in water management builds public
trust as a governance principle.
The next gap is “the culture of participation and collective action is
weak among farmers and they are not willing to take active participation”
(participant 27). Participants explained that farmers seek individual
and short-term interests, particularly in the time of farm irrigation
without considering the benefits of other farmers.
Furthermore, there are conflicts for the revenues of Ab-bandans
between farmers and public organizations. “On the one hand, farmers
claim that the reservoirs have been located in their villages for many years,
so all the benefits must belong to the villages. On the other hand, Ab-bandans
have recently become appealing to the government due to the economic in-
terests” (participant 19). The government claims that according to the
Water Equitable Distribution Law, all the water resources belong to
them and they are responsible for administration, authorization, and
controlling. Bijani and Hayati (2015) called these kinds of disputes
‘open conflict’ and they documented that the top-down water man-
agement by governments is a reason for increasing conflicts.
Another accountability gap is corruption in the rehabilitation pro-
jects. The majority of participants from the private sector agreed that
the selection of private companies by the government for rehabilitation
projects is not based on expertise and experience, but on collusion,
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bribery, and lobby with the government officials in order to obtain the
projects. Angelsen et al. (2009) and Welsch (2002) concluded that poor
management by organizations, lack of proper planning and policy-
making, lack of democracy, low capacity of accountability and trans-
parency as well as the power of officials at top level and their economic
motivations are the main reasons for corruption in environmental
management.
Moreover, findings indicate that there is no monitoring system to
evaluate the quality of Ab-bandans rehabilitation. Participants high-
lighted that many engineering standards are neglected during Ab-ban-
dans rehabilitation. According to UNESCO (2015), a governance system
needs a strong commitment for good accountability.
5.6. Information category
Lack of research in practice is the most significant information gap.
“The academic community does not have a correct understanding of the
realities and problems related to Ab-bandans” (participant 24). According
to the participants, most academic research does not have enough ap-
plicability in actual practice. This is attributed to preferences of aca-
demics to publish their research in journals and improve their scientific
background and/or to obtain research funding, rather than focusing on
real difficulties in rural areas. The solutions for current and future water
problems have to be based on ‘science’ and this requires a multi-
disciplinary and interdisciplinary approach (Jury and Vaux, 2005).
“Statistics and information about Ab-bandans e.g., number, size,
boundaries, storage volume, the size of farms being supplied, number of
users, quantity and quality of runoff, history, etc. are missing or scattered
among different organizations and existing information is not updated reg-
ularly” (participants 24, 17). Participants emphasized that in absence of
a coherent mapping and precise information on Ab-bandans, farmers
simply can trespass on Ab-bandans boundaries without the option to
prove this by the state. Obviously, accurate qualitative and quantitative
information could provide a basis for useful planning for the water
reservoirs.
5.7. Capacity category
Lack of using technology is the major capacity gap. “Since ‘flow
meter’ is not being used, the volume of water entering and leaving the re-
servoirs is not measured” (participant 28). Participants explained that
water consumption in farms cannot be estimated because there is no
technology to measure the rate of water being supplied to the farms.
Lack of using technology e.g., flow meter, modern gate, pump station,
concrete canal, etc. prevents the efficient use of stored water. As Jury
and Vaux (2005) said applying advanced technology in on-farm water
management plays a vital role in dealing with water scarcity.
Another important capacity gap is “the water reservoirs are old hy-
draulic structures and suffer from technical problems like the accumulation
of sediments, wall subsidence, leakage, shallow depth, poor drainage, etc.”
(participant 25). These problems reduce the water storage capacity and
a large volume of stored water escapes. According to the participants,
insufficient budgets for Ab-bandans rehabilitation and lack of attention
to the engineering standards in rehabilitation e.g., inadequate soil
compaction have a dramatic impact on the technical defects.
The next gap is “many farmers assume that water is a free commodity
with no economic value. They are not aware of the real value of water”
(participants 30, 25). According to the approved water tariffs by Iran's
parliament, users of historic hydraulic structures are exempted from
payment of water charges. Therefore, participants believed that farmers
do not appreciate stored water in the reservoirs and cannot see a ne-
cessity for the optimum use of water. In addition, lack of farmers’
knowledge regarding the maintenance of water reservoirs affects the
low efficiency of water usage.
Lack of an appropriate extension system is considered as a capacity
gap. “Extension service for water management is only nominal”
(participant 22). The provincial extension system does not have any
training programs to highlight the importance of water and encourage
local stakeholders to participate in the sustainable management of
water reservoirs. However, there is evidence that encouraging sus-
tainable water management in agriculture needs targeted extension
interventions and social learning among the various actors concerned
(Ison et al., 2007; Berglund and Dworak, 2010).
A further capacity gap is “the view of politicians is more important than
knowledge and ideas of experts in the water-related decisions. Top managers
do not welcome the ideas of thoughtful experts” (participant 21). Due to
this, experts lose their motivation and interest in sharing their knowl-
edge, and they carry out only mandatory requirements for their job.
According to Berg (2013), participation and support of staff are re-
quired for setting goals and a top-down approach is not efficient for
illustration of successful governance.
5.8. Prioritizing categories
As a result of the analyses, we conclude that a number of gaps can
be placed in two or more categories simultaneously. As an example,
fragmentation of tasks across organizations involved can be classified in
the policy and administrative categories. If we assume that the gaps
stand only in the mentioned categories, then we could rank the cate-
gories by applying the Friedman test. The results of the test indicate
that the policy category (M = 5.53) is the most critical one (Table 2).
The lack of a specific law for Ab-bandans as the most important gap
among all the gaps identified highlights the policy category. The ab-
sence of a law for Ab-bandans in the country's water law leads to other
gaps e.g., unclear ownership, conflicts, financial problems, and lack of
guidelines and instructions.
It is necessary to note that water governance challenges are often
interrelated and can exacerbate each other (OECD, 2011). In the cur-
rent study, there is interdependence among the gaps in different cate-
gories. For instance, insufficient budget from the central government
(funding category) results from not only the lack of a specific law for
Ab-bandans (policy category) but also because of the low recognition of
Ab-bandans at the national level (administrative category). Further-
more, due to insufficient budget (funding category) and lack of mon-
itoring and evaluating Ab-bandans rehabilitation (accountability cate-
gory), the water reservoirs face technical defects (capacity category).
6. Conclusion
The lack of a specific law for Ab-bandans is the most acute gap, not
only in the policy category but also in all the gaps identified. Lack of
long-term and strategic planning is considered to be the most important
gap in the objective category, which is rooted in the absence of a
comprehensive approach for water management at the national level.
Low recognition of Ab-bandans at the national level is the most chal-
lenging gap in the administrative category, which can strengthen the
lack of law for Ab-bandans. The financial gap emerges from the unstable
and insignificant budget from the central government. Lack of water
user associations is identified as the most significant gap in the ac-
countability category. A poor connection between academic research
Table 2
Prioritizing the categories.
Category Mean rank Rank N Chi-Square df Sig
Policy 5.53 1 30 74.41 6 0.000
Administrative 5.40 2
Funding 5.35 3
Information 3.40 4
Capacity 3.15 5
Objective 2.75 6
Accountability 2.42 7
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and the actual problems related to Ab-bandans is addressed as the main
gap in the information category. Lastly, lack of using technology is the
major gap in the capacity category, which prevents the efficient use of
stored water in the reservoirs.
The analysis also showed that the policy category is the most critical
category among all. However, the significant issue is that there is in-
terdependence among all the categories and they can strengthen one
another. Therefore, a holistic perspective is needed to understand and
resolve Ab-bandans governance gaps. There is no magic or ‘one-size-fits-
all’ approach (OECD, 2011) to overcome the gaps and a mix of solutions
is required. This is imperative to note that one solution can help to solve
several gaps, and conversely, a single gap may need several solutions.
Reforming and updating the country's water law and determining
the legal status of Ab-bandans in the water law can be a response to
some gaps e.g., unclear ownership status of Ab-bandans, lack of tech-
nical instructions and environmental guidelines, inadequate funding,
and conflicts. A water law for the entire country would not be effective
without special regulations for local water conditions. To reform the
water law, it is necessary to transfer information regarding the water
reservoirs from the government at the regional level to the central
government and regulatory officials. In other words, the relationship
between levels of government is required to bridge the gaps in Ab-
bandans governance.
Co-operation of all relevant organizations at the regional level could
be a solution to prevent fragmentation of tasks and contradictory ob-
jectives. Additionally, organizations involved should agree that Ab-
bandans governance runs into trouble if planning is only restricted to
the government. Therefore, the participation of local stakeholders in
the water-related processes could be considered to solve the gaps.
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A B S T R A C T
Man-made water reservoirs called Ab-bandan in Mazandaran province, Northern Iran are used to collect pre-
cipitation for irrigating rice fields. In spite of their importance, Ab-bandans face governance difficulties such as
the lack of a specific law, the lack of long-term and strategic planning, and low recognition of these reservoirs at
the national level. Therefore, water policy instruments are argued to be needed in order to overcome the barriers
and improve water governance. This paper aims to identify and assess relevant policy instruments for the im-
provement of the governance of Ab-bandans by conducting an exploratory sequential research design. Based on
interviews with 30 regional experts, 31 policy instruments are identified and grouped into three reinforcing
dimensions of water governance; effectiveness, efficiency, and trust and engagement. Afterwards, these policy
instruments are assessed by a larger sample of participants through snowball sampling (n= 169). Confirmatory
Factor Analysis reveals that, in survey participants’ opinion, 28 out of 31 policy instruments identified properly
represent three reinforcing dimensions of water governance. The results indicate that the enhancement of col-
lective action among farmers is the policy instrument which contributes more to the improvement of govern-
ance. Furthermore, the dimensions are positively related to one another. Therefore, the policy instruments are
interdependent and should be addressed in a holistic way.
1. Introduction
Water is the main component required for most activities in human
society. All societies need water for basic survival and economic de-
velopment (Chenoweth, 2008). Thus, the water crisis is one of the key
problems of global relevance in the 21 st century (Orr et al., 2009). The
water crisis is not due to water shortage because sufficient water exists
for all people, even in areas where there is a temporary shortage of
water, but a crisis of governance e.g. fragmented institutional struc-
tures, and weak regulatory framework result in or exacerbate problems
of water availability (OECD, 2011). Scholars in the water sector high-
lighted the fact that enhancing water governance is the solution to the
water crisis (Akhmouch, 2012; Araral and Yu, 2013; Biswas and
Tortajada, 2010; OECD, 2015; Rogers and Hall, 2003; Saleth and Dinar,
2005).
The government of Iran blames the current water crisis on the
changing climate, frequent droughts, and international sanctions in
order to hide the inefficient water management system in the country
(Madani, 2014). Many Iranian experts claim that a failure of water
governance is the more significant cause of water crisis (Foltz, 2002).
Madani (2014) pointed out that the water crisis in Iran is rooted in
managerial, political, and institutional determinants rather than en-
gineering and technical issues. Although the climate has varied over the
centuries, Iran has always been located in an arid and semi-arid region;
therefore, it should not be assumed (as is often the case) that water is
scarce in Iran (Yazdanpanah et al., 2013). The average annual pre-
cipitation of the country is approximately 417 billion cubic meters
(bcm), of which 117 bcm of the precipitation is directly accessible, of
which 92 bcm flows as surface water resources, and 25 bcm infiltrates
into groundwater resources (Ardakanian, 2005).
In contrast to most provinces, the Mazandaran province located in
Northern Iran, which is the most important region for rice production in
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the country, has a high annual average precipitation of 749.9 mm
(Ministry of Agriculture Iran, 2015; Ministry of Energy Iran, 2015). A
considerable amount of the precipitation in Mazandaran occurs during
the non-growing seasons (autumn and winter) (Azmoodeh et al., 2009).
In order to collect this precipitation to be used for irrigating rice fields
during the growing seasons (spring and summer), there are man-made
reservoirs called Ab-bandan (Abbasian et al., 2014). In spite of these
reservoirs, a significant amount of precipitation runs off into the sea
through rivers without being stored (Azmoodeh et al., 2009), some-
times even causing water-logging or flooding (Ministry of Agriculture
Iran, 2016). This province has a potential of 4.9 billion m3 as surface
water resources, and of which around 2.2 billion m3 is being stored and
the remaining water flows into the sea (Ejlali et al., 2016). According to
a number of regional experts, Ab-bandans are not well governed due to
the lack of a specific law, the lack of long-term and strategic planning of
administrative bodies, low recognition of Ab-bandans at the national
level, financial problems for rehabilitation of Ab-bandans, lack of water
user associations, little relevance of academic research on Ab-bandans
to practice, and poor use of water technology (Mirzaei et al., 2017).
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) states that practical water policy instruments for local and
national governments are needed to overcome barriers (OECD, 2011).
Policy instruments refer to the tools used by governments and public
authorities to address related problems and achieve a public policy goal
(Linder and Peters, 1989). In fact, water policy instruments are tools,
strategies, and mechanisms for policy-makers to overcome governance
obstacles in water policy; for instance, involving sub-national govern-
ments in designing water policy beyond their roles as implementers is a
policy instrument to foster effective water management (OECD, 2011).
The main purpose of water policy instruments is to enhance water
conservation and efficient use of water resources, and a comprehensive
evaluation of policy instruments is essential to achieve sustainable
agricultural water management (Feike and Henseler, 2017). A lot can
be said about different types of policy instruments in general, their
respective effectiveness and efficiency, although they have to be ad-
justed to regional condition (Akhmouch, 2012; Akhmouch and Correia,
2016; Araral and Yu, 2013; OECD, 2015; Rogers and Hall, 2003). Since
water governance is highly contextual, water policy instruments have
to be appropriate for different places (OECD, 2015).
Although there is literature related to water management in Iran,
research which specifically addresses policy instruments for the im-
provement of the governance of Ab-bandans is not existent. Therefore,
this paper adds additional value to the scientific and empirical evidence
by identifying relevant water policy instruments and assessing the
suitability of these multiple instruments in an integrated way towards
good governance of Ab-bandans in the Mazandaran province of
Northern Iran. This paper aims 1) to identify policy instruments for the
improvement of the governance of Ab-bandans; 2) to cluster these in-
struments on three OECD reinforcing dimensions of water governance;
3) to assess how and to what extent the instruments grouped in each
dimension contribute to the improvement of the governance of Ab-
bandans. In this paper following the introduction, Section 2 details the
theoretical background, explaining the OECD dimensions and princi-
ples on water governance; Section 3 introduces the study area; Section 4
describes the sequential exploratory method for collecting and ana-
lyzing data; Section 5 presents findings and is followed by a discussion
and conclusion of the research findings in Sections 6 and 7, respec-
tively.
2. Theoretical background
Water governance is a broader concept than water management
(Moench et al., 2003). It encompasses the political, social, economic,
and administrative systems involved in making decisions for manage-
ment of water resources, as well as water service delivery at different
levels of society (Global Water Partnership, 2003). Rogers and Hall
(2003: 16) noted that the governance for water is “the ability to design
public policies and institutional frameworks that are socially accepted
and mobilize social resources in support of them”.
OECD (2015a: 5) defines water governance as “the range of poli-
tical, institutional and administrative rules, practices, and processes
(formal and informal) through which decisions are taken and im-
plemented, stakeholders can articulate their interests and have their
concerns considered, and decision-makers are held accountable for
water management”. As public authorities are in charge of water re-
sources management in Iran (Ardakanian, 2005), it is crucial to un-
derstand their role with regard to the governance of Ab-bandans
through the effective design and implementation of water policies. This
paper focuses on public authorities’ roles for water governance and
their involvement in political, institutional and administrative issues;
therefore, it takes a close look at water policy instruments which can be
applied by public authorities for solving challenges of the governance of
Ab-bandans.
Governance is considered as ‘good governance’ when it is able to
solve challenges for achieving results in a fair and comprehensive
manner. Good governance in the water sector leads to sustainable water
management for ensuring water security which is consistent with the
goals legitimately established by a society (Akhmouch and Correia,
2016). OECD (2015a) clarified water governance as good governance, if
a combination of bottom-up and top-down processes is applied to tackle
water challenges and resolve conflictive issues related to water re-
sources, while fostering constructive state-society relations. Good or
effective governance systems provide processes and structures to fa-
cilitate actions for all actors involved in water management and do not
create development obstacles (Rogers and Hall, 2003).
Good water governance cannot be achieved with the use of blue-
prints from outside of the given regions or countries and it has to be
aligned with territorial specificities (Batchelor, 2007). However, OECD
(2015a) has formulated a menu of principles based on three mutually
reinforcing and complementary dimensions of water governance. The
OECD principles consider different policy instruments which can be
applied by governments at all levels to strengthen water governance to
fit for current and future water challenges. The principles were devel-
oped by the OECD Water Governance Initiative, a multi-stakeholder
platform of over 100 delegates from public, private, and non-profit
sectors to scale up governance responses to water challenges. A pre-
liminary step to developing the principles consisted in preparing an
inventory of tools, guidelines, and principles on water governance to
take stock of what already exists. This document comprises 108 gov-
ernance tools among which 55 are specific to the water sector. These
principles were grouped into three dimensions (i.e. effectiveness, effi-
ciency, trust and engagement) and approved by the OECD Regional
Development Policy Committee through a written procedure on 11 May
2015. Each of the dimensions and related principles are explained as
follows:
1) The dimension of effectiveness refers to a clear definition of water-
related goals and targets at all government levels, so that the goals
are well implemented and the expected targets are obtained. The
dimension of effectiveness consists of the following four principles:
Principle 1: Clear allocation of roles and responsibilities across
levels of government for policy making, policy implementation, op-
erational management, and regulation and enforcement, at the same
time fostering effective co-ordination across levels of government.
Principle 2: Managing water at the appropriate scale(s) to reflect
local conditions, therefore ensuring an appropriate hydrological man-
agement and promoting strategies based on national policies and local
conditions.
Principle 3: Encouraging policy coherence through effective cross-
sectoral co-ordination mechanisms and recognition and mitigation of
conflicts among authorities involved.
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Principle 4: Promoting technical, financial, and institutional ca-
pacity through training water professionals and stakeholders and hiring
public officials and professionals based on required competencies.
1) The dimension of efficiency includes maximizing the benefits of
water resource management with minimal costs for society. The
dimension of efficiency consists of the following four principles:
Principle 5: Producing, updating, and sharing water-related data
and information in a timely, consistent, and comparable manner to
guide, assess, and improve water policy. Sharing information with
stakeholders and encouraging their engagement in producing in-
formation is necessary in order to foster transparency, trust, and com-
parability.
Principle 6: Promoting governance arrangements that help water
organizations across levels of government raise the necessary revenues
to meet their mandates and allocate financial resources in an efficient,
transparent, and timely manner.
Principle 7: Enforcing appropriate regulatory frameworks effec-
tively so as to achieve water policy objectives and encourage long-term
planning.
Principle 8: Promoting innovative water governance practices
across levels of government and stakeholders through pilot-testing on
water governance, lessons from success and failures, social learning,
and scientists’ involvement.
1) The dimension of trust and engagement addresses building trust in
public organizations and policy instruments and ensuring the in-
volvement of all stakeholders through democracy and fairness for
society. The dimension of trust and engagement consists of the fol-
lowing four principles:
Principle 9: Promoting integrity and transparency practices across
authorities involved to enable clear accountability and transparent
decision-making and implementation.
Principle 10: Promoting stakeholders engagement for designing
and implementing water policies through identifying different stake-
holders, and their responsibilities and interactions, paying attention to
vulnerable groups e.g. women and youth, and mitigating the power of
over-represented groups.
Principle 11: Ensuring equity across water stakeholders, rural and
urban areas, and generations through non-discriminatory participation,
empowering local officials and water stakeholders, promoting public
discussions to raise awareness, and assessing the consequences of water
policies on citizens, stakeholders, and different areas.
Principle 12: Promoting regular monitoring and evaluation of
water policies through dedicated and independent institutions for
monitoring and evaluation, developing reliable mechanisms for reports,
assessing achievement of intended targets, and sharing results with the
public in a timely and transparent manner.
In order to have an effective and long-term water management, a
combination of principles should be used for designing water policies
(OECD, 2011). An overview of the three mutually reinforcing OECD
dimensions of water governance is illustrated in Fig. 1.
3. Study area: geography and Ab-bandans characteristics
The Mazandaran Province is located in Northern Iran along the
southern coast of the Caspian Sea (53°6′ E, 36°23′N) with an area of
24.000 km2 (1.46% of the total area of Iran) (Kheyroddin and
Hedayatifard, 2017) (Fig. 2). The climate of the area is divided into two
types: (1) moderate Caspian weather with hot and humid summers,
mild and humid winters, (2) cold mountainous weather with long
freezing winters and short cool summers, especially in the mountains
(Khoshbakht and Hammer, 2006). It has a high production capacity of
agriculture due to humid temperate climate and suitable soil
(Khoshbakht and Hammer, 2006). Mazandaran plays an important role
in food security in Iran because it ranks first with 41.73% of rice pro-
duction as a staple food (Ministry of Agriculture Iran, 2015).
There are 880 Ab-bandans in Mazandaran with an area of around
17,000 ha, depths varying from 1.5m to 4m and sizes ranging from
3 ha to 1000 ha (Mazandaran Regional Water Authority, 2016). It is
assumed that Ab-bandans are about 3000 years old (Rahimi Farahani
et al., 2012). They are traditional water harvesting systems (Ghoddousi,
1999), which are constructed by digging the land and compacting the
soil to construct a wall around the excavated pond (Ejlali et al., 2012).
Water per hectare of Ab-bandans can supply water requirements for 6 ha
of rice fields in this area (Mazandaran Regional Water Authority, 2016).
In addition to storing water for rice cultivation, Ab-bandans can play a
significant role in recharging underground water and wells, collecting
drainage water, aquaculture, habitat for birds and plants, attracting
tourism, creating jobs, and preventing the migration of rural people to
the cities (Salabi, 2010).
4. Material and methods
An exploratory sequential design was followed as a mixed methods
approach for the purpose of research. Mixed methods research involves
both quantitative and qualitative research for a deeper understanding
of a phenomenon (Johnson et al., 2007). Specifically, we employed an
‘instrument development’ variant of the exploratory sequential design,
in which researchers first gather the qualitative data in order to explore
the research topic with a few participants, and then the qualitative data
is used to develop a quantitative instrument for a large sample
(Creswell and Plano-Clark, 2007) (Fig. 3). This design is suitable when
researchers want to build and test an instrument, to identify unknown
variables, to study a phenomenon in more depth, and also to generalize
results to a large group (Creswell and Plano-Clark, 2007).
In the qualitative phase, we used semi-structured, face-to-face in-
terviews to collect qualitative data. Interviews were conducted with
experts who are working in public administration and in private com-
panies pertaining to water management at the regional level. We in-
itially applied purposive sampling and started with eight interviewees
who were known to the researchers. Then, we asked them for other
Fig. 1. Overview of the three mutually reinforcing OECD dimensions of water
governance.
Adopted from OECD (2015a) and Akhmouch and Correia (2016).
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possible interview partners. Finally, 30 people were asked to answer the
main question about different instruments and strategies required for
improving the governance of Ab-bandans and overcoming related bar-
riers. Interviewees from the public sector (19 interviewees) included
individuals from the Agriculture Organization, the Forest, Range and
Watershed Management Organization, the Regional Water Authority,
the Department of Environment, and the Fisheries Organization.
Interviewees from the private companies (11 interviewees) were tech-
nical engineers who are involved in the design and implementation of
rehabilitation projects for Ab-bandans. Investigating the views of people
in the wide range of public and private entities involved in water
management at the regional level increased the credibility of the re-
search (Shenton, 2004). We conducted the interviews in dialogue form,
using tailored questions based on the OECD principles. All the inter-
views were recorded and transcribed verbatim. We reviewed the tran-
scripts to extract policy instruments for the improvement of the gov-
ernance of Ab-bandans, and we identified 31 different policy
instruments. Ultimately, the instruments identified were clustered and
grouped according to the OECD dimensions (Fig. 1).
The results from the qualitative phase were applied to build a
questionnaire for the quantitative phase in a way that each of the three
dimensions included 9, 12, 10 items (i.e. policy instruments), respec-
tively with a numerical 10-point scale (see Table 1). “The use of
numerical scale helps to discover the presence of measurement con-
tinuum and to avoid the semantic interpretation, a typical problem
related to verbal scales” (Schifini et al., 2004: 2). Andrews (1984)
showed that increasing the number of scale categories improve data
quality due to making better validity and reducing residual errors.
In order to maximize the content validity of the questionnaire, we
selected 4 of the interviewees as a panel of judges and asked them to
revise the relevance of items to the constructs being measured and the
clarity and conciseness of the items. The final decision whether to ac-
cept or reject the recommendations was the responsibility of the re-
searchers, as the scale developers (DeVellis, 2003). Based on the result
of Cronbach’s alpha using SPSS software (0.76 for effectiveness, 0.79
for efficiency, 0.86 for trust and engagement), we decided to retain all
the items in the questionnaire. Afterwards, we distributed the ques-
tionnaires to a large sample of participants through snowball sampling
and asked them to rate the importance of each policy instrument to
improve the governance of Ab-bandans from 1 to 10. A score of 1 refers
to no importance and a score of 10 to high importance of the instru-
ments. Finally, 169 questionnaires (n=169) were collected and ana-
lyzed (Fig. 4).
A Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was conducted using LISREL
software to analyze the quantitative data. The CFA helped to assess how
and to what extent the policy instruments identified (i.e. observed
Fig. 2. Geographical position of the study area.
Adopted from http://www.d-maps.com.
Fig. 3. Exploratory sequential design: Instrument development model.
Adopted from Creswell and Plano-Clark (2007).
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variables) can logically and systematically represent three reinforcing
dimensions of the governance of Ab-bandans (i.e. latent variables/con-
structs). The CFA is a type of Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) to
test the relationships between observed variables (a variable that can be
directly measured) and latent variables (a variable that is a theoretical
concept and cannot be observed directly) (Brown, 2006). In the CFA,
researchers postulate relations between the observed variables and the
underlying latent variables a priori and then test this hypothesized
model statistically (Byrne, 2010). In this paper, we assumed the hy-
pothesized model as positive relations between the policy instruments
identified and their related dimensions.
Table 1
Policy instruments identified and clustered on three OECD dimensions.
Dimensions (latent variables/constructs) Label Policy instruments (observed variables) Label
Improvement of
Effectiveness Dimension
EFED Establishing a commission at the national government level for Ab-bandans A1
Establishing a provincial commission with participation of all public and private actors, and local stakeholders A2
Determining a single agency in charge of A-bandans at the regional government level A3
Setting water-related regulations based on territorial specificities A4
Promoting meritocracy in administrative procedures to carry out duties A5
Training and raising the awareness of water-related professionals A6
Training farmers regarding conservation and optimal use of water A7
Training farmers for acceptance of new projects regarding multiple functions of Ab-bandans A8
Reconstruction and modernization of Ab-bandans A9
Improvement of
Efficiency Dimension
EFID Approving a particular law for Ab-bandans along with the law enforcement requirements B1
Encouraging local water market by public authorities B2
Imposing water charges from farmers B3
Allocating grants for rehabilitation of Ab-bandans from the central government B4
Developing a data bank for Ab-bandans accessible for all public and private entities, and local stakeholders B5
Long-term and comprehensive plans for water resource management at the national and regional levels B6
Including courses related to different traditional water harvesting systems of the country e.g. Ab-bandans in the
universities
B7
Providing rural people with loans at low-cost interest rates in order to create jobs using the potentials of Ab-bandans B8
Encouraging non-governmental bodies by public authorities to invest in potentials of Ab-bandans B9
Conducting experimentation and pilot projects on various potentials of Ab-bandans B10
Registering Ab-bandans as national heritage B11
Using social media to create social network for water conservation B12
Improvement of
Trust and Engagement
Dimension
TED Improving the attitudes of public officials about the importance of local participation in the management of Ab-bandans C1
Mitigating conflicts among local stakeholders through reinforcing local councils and a culture of dialogue C2
Developing trust in public officials through addressing farmers and their needs in water-related decisions and planning C3
Ensuring the transparency of public officials' performance in the water sector through mass media C4
Enhancing participation and teamwork among farmers through improving their attitude towards collective action in
the management of Ab-bandans
C5
Establishing water user associations C6
Ensuring legal authority of water user associations C7
Determining the complementary role of Ab-bandans as traditional water harvesting system in modern irrigation
networks
C8
Developing independent institutions with participation of non-governmental bodies and local stakeholders for
monitoring and evaluating issues related to Ab-bandans
C9
Involving local graduates of water-related disciplines to cooperate in the management of Ab-bandans C10
Fig. 4. The percentage of survey participants in the quantitative phase.
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5. Findings
Table 1 presents the policy instruments mentioned by the 30 in-
terviewees in the qualitative phase as well as the classification of these
instruments on three OECD reinforcing dimensions (effectiveness, effi-
ciency, trust and engagement) of water governance.
Afterwards, the CFA was performed to evaluate the goodness-of-fit
of the hypothesized model. A number of requirements for conducting
the CFA were checked. First of all, the linear interpolation method was
used for replacing missing values (Runkler, 2016). The result revealed
that there were no systematic missing values. Furthermore, data
screening showed that the observed variable of A3 should be removed
from the data due to a number of extreme values. Then, the normality
assumption was tested and the result indicated that the data were not
normally distributed. This fact led to the adoption of the Unweighted
Least Squares (ULS) estimation method which does not depend on a
normality distribution assumption (Schumacker and Lomax, 2016).
To assess the fitness of the hypothesized model, various indices were
calculated (Table 2). It was found that the hypothesized model revealed
a poor fit to the data in some indices (X2/df꞊3.826; RMSEA꞊0.130).
Therefore, modification indices were applied by freeing error covar-
iance between “A1 and A2″, “B7 and B8″, “C6 and C7″, and “C7 and
C8″, respectively. Additionally, B3 and B4 with a factor loading of less
than 0.30 were excluded from the hypothesized model (Brown, 2006;
Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). After modifications, as the goodness-of-
fit indices indicate in Table 2, an acceptable fit to the data was
achieved. As a result, all 28 remaining observed variables within the
modified model properly represent three latent variables. Table 2 pro-
vides an overview of criteria for goodness-of-fit indices of the modified
model.
Convergent validity was assessed in order to examine construct
validity. The convergent validity is the correlation between two or more
measures of a specific construct (Westen and Rosenthal, 2003; Hair
et al., 2010), and it is assessed based on the Standardized Factor
Loading (λ), Average Variance Extracted (AVE), and Composite Relia-
bility (CR). The factor loadings values should be equal or greater than
0.3 (Brown, 2006; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013) and the acceptable
values of the AVE and CR were considered to be ≥0.5 and ≥0.7, re-
spectively (Hair et al., 2010). The results confirmed that all factor
loadings are greater than 0.3 and the values of CR range from 0.808 to
0.866 indicating the adequate internal consistency of the constructs.
The AVE was below the adequate value, nevertheless, Fornell and
Larcker (1981) noted that if AVE is less than 0.50, the variance due to
measurement error is larger than the variance captured by the con-
struct. However, based on the composite reliability alone, researchers
may conclude that the convergent validity of the construct is adequate,
even though more than 50% of the variance is due to the measurement
error. Therefore, as shown in Table 3, the modified model had good
convergent validity.
The results of the Correlation Matrix/Phi (i.e. intercorrelations
among all latent variables) indicated that the constructs of “EFED”,
“EFID”, and “TED” were positively related to one another (Fig. 5). This
means that changes in one observed variable of a given construct are
associated with proportional changes in the other constructs (Hair
et al., 2010). The results also showed that the t-values of all paths be-
tween observed variables and their underlying constructs were statis-
tically significant (Table 3, Fig. 5). Therefore, these observed variables
play a significant role in representing the three constructs. Moreover,
observed variables with higher factor loadings are representative of the
construct (Hair et al., 2010) (Table 3). In other words, factor loadings
indicate the correlation of each observed variable and the construct,
and they give us an idea about how much the variable has contributed
to the construct (Yong and Pearce, 2013). Hence, those observed vari-
ables (i.e. policy instruments) which are highly related to their con-
structs play more roles in representing the construct and are more
contributed to their construct. Based on the larger factor loadings, the
following policy instruments are more contributed to the improvement
of the governance of Ab-bandans:
Policy instruments in the improvement of effectiveness dimension
Table 2
Criteria for the goodness-of-fit indices.
Indices Shorthand Recommended criteria Modified model Source
Ratio of X2 to df X2/df 2 < X2/df ≤ 3 1.493 Schermelleh-Engel et al. (2003)
Normed Fit Index NFI 0.90 ≤ NFI < 0.95 0.930 Schermelleh-Engel et al. (2003)
Tucker-Lewis Index TLI TLI ≥ 0.95 0.973 Brown (2006)
Comparative Fit Index CFI CFI ≥ 0.95 0.976 Brown (2006)
Incremental Fit Index IFI IFI ≥ 0.95 0.976 Schreiber et al. (2006)
Relative Fit Index RFI RFI > 0.90 0.923 Hu and Bentler (1999)
Meyers et al. (2006)
Goodness of Fit Index GFI 0.90 ≤ GFI < 0.95 0.947 Schermelleh-Engel et al. (2003)
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index AGFI AGFI ≥ 0.90 0.937 Hooper et al. (2008)
Root Mean Square Of Approximation RMSEA 0.05 < RMSEA ≤ 0.08 0.054 Schermelleh-Engel et al. (2003)
Parsimony-adjusted Normed-Fit Index PNFI PNFI > 0.50 0.846 Meyers et al. (2006)
Table 3
Convergent validity for the latent variables (n= 169).
Latent
variables
Observed
variables
t-value Standardized
Factor
Loadings (λ)
Standard
Error
(SE)
Composite
Reliability
(CR)
EFED A1 13.503 0.465 0.059 0.808
A2 RVa 0.583 RV
A4 14.874 0.542 0.062
A5 15.466 0.602 0.066
A6 15.349 0.592 0.066
A7 15.844 0.679 0.073
A8 14.967 0.593 0.068
A9 15.869 0.639 0.069
EFID B1 15.270 0.559 0.060 0.814
B2 15.138 0.565 0.062
B5 14.027 0.481 0.057
B6 15.523 0.607 0.065
B7 14.917 0.532 0.059
B8 14.977 0.560 0.062
B9 13.693 0.462 0.056
B10 15.750 0.598 0.063
B11 15.495 0.556 0.059
B12 RV 0.601 RV
TED C1 18.654 0.718 0.051 0.866
C2 18.712 0.735 0.052
C3 RV 0.748 RV
C4 18.622 0.720 0.051
C5 19.608 0.779 0.053
C6 14.445 0.479 0.044
C7 12.632 0.410 0.043
C8 15.955 0.554 0.046
C9 16.779 0.572 0.045
C10 15.581 0.513 0.044
a A reference variable is used for scaling up the latent variables through
fixing one of the relevant paths to 1.0.
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A7 (λ=0.679): Training farmers regarding conservation and op-
timal use of water
A9 (λ=0.639): Reconstruction and modernization of Ab-bandans
A5 (λ=0.602): Promoting meritocracy in administrative proce-
dures to carry out duties
A8 (λ=0.593): Training farmers for acceptance of new projects
regarding multiple functions of Ab-bandans
Policy instruments in the improvement of efficiency dimension
B6 (λ=0.607): Long-term and comprehensive plans for water re-
source management at the national and regional levels
B12 (λ=0.601): Using social media to create social network for
water conservation
B10 (λ=0.598): Conducting experimentation and pilot projects on
various potentials of Ab-bandans
B2 (λ=0.565): Encouraging local water market by public autho-
rities
Policy instruments in the improvement of trust and engagement
dimension
C5 (λ=0.779) (the highest factor loading among all): Enhancing
participation and teamwork among farmers through improving their
attitude towards collective action in the management of Ab-bandans
C3 (λ=0.748): Developing trust in public officials through ad-
dressing farmers and their needs in water-related decisions and plan-
ning
C2 (λ=0.735): Mitigating conflicts among local stakeholders
through reinforcing local councils and a culture of dialogue
C4 (λ=0.720): Ensuring the transparency of public officials' per-
formance in the water sector through mass media
6. Discussion
In this study, public instruments for the improvement of the gov-
ernance of Ab-bandans were identified and grouped into three OECD
dimensions. Based on the CFA, the modified model which consisted of
28 policy instruments properly represents three reinforcing dimensions.
The following subsections include a discussion of the policy instruments
Fig. 5. The modified model of the improvement of Ab-bandans' governance.
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which are more contributed to the improvement of the governance of
Ab-bandans.
6.1. Improvement of effectiveness dimension
6.1.1. Training farmers regarding conservation and optimal use of water
Interviewees believed that it is not possible to improve knowledge
and perception of farmers regarding optimal use of water without
adequate training and raised awareness. For instance, farmers have to
be aware that storing water above the maximum storage level and
keeping a reservoir full, can destroy the reservoirs due to the generation
of high waves. Thus, training and building the capacity of farmers as
end-users for the protection of Ab-bandans is necessary. It is imperative
to note that the training approach should be based on a participatory
learning process and knowledge sharing among farmers. This is a totally
different approach from simply delivering knowledge, and it aims to
strengthen the problem-solving skills of farmers by fostering partici-
pation, self-confidence, dialogue, joint decision making, and self-de-
termination (Röling and van de Fliert, 1994). This training approach
increases farmers' knowledge and empowers them to change their
perspectives and behavior in order to be active in altering the current
condition to a desired one (Hjorth, 2003).
Interviewees added that training is not limited to farmers, but water
professionals and public officials have to be aware of the economic,
environmental and social values of Ab-bandans, the importance of local
stakeholders’ participation, optimal utilization and management of
water, and related engineering and technical issues. Since the capacity
of an organization strongly depends on the capabilities of its personnel,
training approach for professionals is a crucial policy for capacity
building across the full range of water organizations. It could be per-
formed through specially designed courses, modification of university
courses, in-service modules, seminars, and workshops (Global Water
Partnership, 2017).
6.1.2. Reconstruction and modernization of Ab-bandans
Based on the interviewees’ opinion, the infrastructure of A-bandans
has to be improved using advanced technology. For instance, installing
modern gates and digital meters can control the volume of water en-
tering and leaving the reservoirs and prevent water wastage. When this
has been done, Ab-bandans as traditional water harvesting systems
which are consistent with indigenous knowledge and culture can be
integrated with modern irrigation networks (i.e. dams), and their in-
teraction with dams in irrigation system could be determined. The in-
terviewees added that farmers should know the purpose and benefits of
adopting water technology as well as the usage, so that they are willing
to participate in the adoption and maintenance of a given technology.
In this way, Ab-bandans will be considered as small dams within rural
communities which not only improve the economic conditions but also
strengthen social cohesion and motivation to remain in the village. As
Evans and Sadler (2008) mentioned technology-oriented policies (e.g.
advanced irrigation systems) are appropriate tools for a more water-
efficient management as this protects and uses less water which in turn
increases crop productivity and ultimately achieves an economic ad-
vantage for farmers. Akhmouch (2012) stated that new technologies
and innovative water processes are effective for approaching cost-ef-
fective objectives and water security which require the transfer of
know-how at the regional and local level, especially when service de-
livery is not managed by the private sector. Levidow et al. (2014) also
concluded that proper use of technology is more important than tech-
nological investment which depends on applied research, demonstra-
tion activities, outreach, farmers’ training, and skills development.
6.1.3. Promoting meritocracy in administrative procedures to carry out
duties
Interviewees stated that employing professionals in the water-re-
lated public administration should be based on capabilities and
competencies regardless of political orientation. Water professionals
could carry out their tasks properly and play an effective role in the
success of water organizations, if they possess the necessary knowledge
and skill in their job. Furthermore, interviewees mentioned that top
managers should regard thoughtful and knowledgeable professionals as
an opportunity for water organizations and provide an atmosphere
which aims at the acquisition of creative ideas. Meritocracy is one of the
most basic aspects of organizational culture which emphasizes the link
between individual merit and career without being biased against
gender, race, class or any other non-merit factors (Castilla and Benard,
2010). OECD (2015a) highlighted that the most vital resource of each
organization is its employees; therefore, employing public officials and
professionals in the water sector should be merit-oriented, transparent,
and independent of political cycles.
6.1.4. Training farmers for acceptance of new projects regarding multiple
functions of Ab-bandans
According to the interviewees, farmers should be involved in the
process of studying, designing, and implementing new projects re-
garding multiple functions of Ab-bandans, and they should be trained
with regard to the importance and benefits of these projects during the
process. Otherwise, not only the project objectives cannot be achieved,
but these projects could also lead to conflicts and confrontation among
different groups of beneficiaries, and distrust of the government. It must
be kept in mind that the goals of rural development projects are not
merely reaching economic benefits, but also creating social products
e.g. upgraded local leadership, a culture of enterprise and innovative
action, increased engagement capacity among people to overcome
problems, and effective use of opportunities. Therefore, the provision of
educational policies for adoption of development programs seems to be
necessary (Lowe et al., 1999). OECD/Noya and Clarence (2009) also
reported that all members of the community should be empowered to
cooperate in rural development through the enhancement of knowl-
edge, skills, and competencies.
6.2. Improvement of efficiency dimension
6.2.1. Long-term and comprehensive plans for water resource management
at the national and regional levels
Interviewees believed that a comprehensive and long-term national
plan for the sustainable conservation of water resources in consistence
with the ecological, economic, and social features should be addressed.
Moreover, regional water management with respect to the role of Ab-
bandans and the sustainable use of their various potentials should also
be included in this national planning. Ardakanian (2005) believed that
long-term policies and strategies are required for water resource man-
agement in Iran, and establishing a comprehensive national water
management system based on all elements of water cycle should be
considered in water management policies. In addition, this system
needs to be strongly linked to a "national spatial strategy plan" based on
the natural water basins of the country (Ardakanian, 2005), because
water management and spatial planning are directly related to each
other (Woltjer and Al, 2007). In other words, regional plans for de-
velopment, exploitation, and conservation of water resources have to be
designed under the umbrella of national and comprehensive watershed-
based plans (Ardakanian, 2005).
6.2.2. Using social media to create social network for water conservation
“Social media can be useful as a tool for turning water threats into a
social and inclusive concern, as well as creating a public space to dis-
cuss them” (statement of one interviewee). This is due to the fact that
the application of social media as one of the most innovative means of
information and communication technology has been widely welcomed
recently (Boon and Sinclair, 2009). It allows certain slogans, contents,
and ideas to spread rapidly as the main social media feature is its viral
nature (Nalewajek and Mącik, 2013). In this way, public officials can
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convey their messages to people and unite them for a common purpose
(Terracina-Hartman et al. (2013)). The study of Roshandel Arbatani
et al. (2016) on Zayandeh-Rood River in Iran showed that social media
strongly influenced the environmental behavior of citizens and im-
proved their knowledge, attitudes, emotions, and behaviors regarding
environmental protection. Moreover, social media led citizens to con-
sider environmental hazards which were of no concern to them before
membership in the virtual environmental groups, and to participate
financially in environmental protection. In addition, it provides a fa-
cility in which citizens are able to criticize the government's environ-
mental policies.
6.2.3. Conducting experimentation and pilot projects on various potentials
of Ab-bandans
A simultaneous use of various functions of Ab-bandans should be
tested in a number of cases and its social, economic, and environmental
consequences should be carefully investigated. Interviewees believed
that in advance of a wider introduction, visiting pilot projects by
farmers is an effective way of building trust in the government and
increasing participation and awareness among farmers on the in-
tegrated use of potentials. As political tools the pilots provide a good
opportunity for policies and strategies to be tested before extensive
implementation, but also generate knowledge that can be transferred to
the community (Vreugdenhil and Slinger, 2008; Vreugdenhil et al.,
2010). The pilot projects are widely used to introduce government
policies and plans (Nair and Howlett, 2015), and managers in the water
sector regularly apply pilots as instruments for testing innovations and
implementing policies on a small scale (Vreugdenhil et al., 2010).
According to the interviewees, after ensuring that the pilots can be
implemented on a large scale, it is possible to continue by providing
local people with loans at low-cost interest rates in order to create jobs
based on the potentials of Ab-bandans in the form of groups and asso-
ciations, and consequently improving income and livelihood in the
communities. Ab-bandans can be used as an income source for rural
households in different ways e.g. a place for spending leisure and re-
creation time, attracting tourists through building floating restaurants,
organizing fishing and boating tournaments, etc. Creating sustainable
jobs based on the potentials of Ab-bandans not only enhances a sense of
ownership and participation in exploitation and maintenance processes,
but also contributes to the rural development and so prevents the mi-
gration of rural people, especially new generations, to the cities.
6.2.4. Encouraging local water market by public authorities
A number of interviewees pointed out that recently farmers who are
users of Ab-bandans sell water to other farmers within the village
through the informal market when Ab-bandans have more water than
they require. This type of water market includes an informal agreement
between neighboring farmers about how to share supplied or extracted
water for mutual benefit. Based on the local agreement, one farmer who
allows access to his water to another farmer receives economic benefits
(Nikolakis et al., 2013). However, Faruqui (2001) emphasized that
governments must undertake studies for water markets and make ne-
cessary legal, institutional, and economic reforms through involving
multi-stakeholders. Moreover, Nikolakis et al. (2013) added that
market-based approaches in natural resource governance only have
social legitimacy if they are consistent with the values of local stake-
holders, in addition, “a slow evolution of farmers mentality is required”
(Go´mez-Limo´n and Martı´nez, 2006: 334).
6.3. Improvement of trust and engagement dimension
6.3.1. Enhancing participation and teamwork among farmers through
improving their attitude
This instrument plays more roles in the governance of Ab-bandans,
not only in the trust and engagement dimension but also in all di-
mensions. According to one interviewee, "participation of farmers has
to be the result of their intellectual development and internal desire and
motivation". Encouraging farmers’ participation requires the promotion
of their attitude towards collective preferences rather than individual
and short-term benefits. If farmers have a positive attitude towards
collective action, they can see that participation in water-related pro-
cesses is beneficial both for themselves and for their society. Otherwise,
it is impossible to force them to actively engage; the development of
their attitude and willingness is an effective component for enhancing
participation among farmers. According to Dungumaro and Madulu
(2003), fostering the sense of cooperation and participation in local
communities through their involvement in the assessment and solving
of water problems can also be effective for resolving conflicts. This in
turn can build trust between local stakeholders and water organizations
which would lead to a sense of ownership and responsibility among
local communities (Dungumaro and Madulu, 2003).
Interviewees highlighted the fact that public officials should also
have a positive attitude towards the participation of farmers in the
management of Ab-bandans. It is important to understand that design
and management of development projects outside rural areas which are
then introduced into rural communities for implementation, cannot be
successful. Thus, the attitude of the government that they know ev-
erything while rural people are inexperienced and not knowledgeable,
should move towards bottom-up development and putting people first
(Oakley, 1991). Based on interviews conducted, it was revealed that the
government should undertake the role of a facilitator in the manage-
ment of Ab-bandans, rather than administrator and executor and should
conduct participatory management for Ab-bandans. Interviewees em-
phasized that the management of Ab-bandans should be given to
farmers in the form of water user associations. Wanga et al. (2006)
believed that farmers are the key decision makers and should decide on
their roles as well as the activities and roles which they want their
managers and leaders to perform. Indeed, farmers are able to partici-
pate in a collective manner in all aspects of water management in-
cluding physical, financial, decision making, evaluation, and mon-
itoring aspects (Wanga et al., 2006).
6.3.2. Developing trust in public officials through addressing farmers and
their needs in water-related decisions and planning
Collective attitudes and participatory behavior of farmers are es-
sential for water management, but trust in the government is also im-
portant for successful participatory governance because if farmers do
not trust government officials, the likelihood of their participation is
reduced (Lubell, 2004). According to one interviewee, “building trust in
the government can lead to the participation of farmers in the adoption
of new projects regarding the various potentials of Ab-bandans”. In fact,
farmers should feel that meeting their needs is the main concern of the
government in the management of Ab-bandans so that they can trust the
government and show participatory and peaceful behavior. Most water
conflicts in the agricultural sector in Iran are between government (as
an administrator of water management) and farmers (as users) (Bijani
and Hayati, 2011), therefore building public trust in the government
through democratic legitimacy and fairness plays a vital role as a
principle in water governance (OECD, 2015).
6.3.3. Mitigating conflicts among local stakeholders
One interviewee cited that “farmers have to reach social maturity
and social acceptance of each other”. It appears that the achievement of
an agreement among local stakeholders and the admittance of each
other are crucial in order to solve barriers and create a participatory
approach to the governance of Ab-bandans. According to the inter-
viewees, water policy should be based on conflicts resolution among
local stakeholders using mechanisms such as strengthening rural dis-
pute resolution councils, promoting a culture of dialogue, and unbiased
government intervention. Swatuk et al. (2008) said that promoting ef-
fective communication and collaboration in spite of diverse interests,
identifying the causes of conflicts, building trust, and planning in a
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participatory manner should be considered in the management of
conflicts. This should include the employment of various methods e.g.
negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and consensus building (Swatuk
et al., 2008). Bijani and Hayati (2011) argued that change from gov-
ernmentality to governance is the best way to reduce and eliminate
water conflicts in Iran which need cultural enhancement, public parti-
cipation, government support (without being authoritative), and
training of local stakeholders. It should be considered that water con-
flicts cannot be solved simply through a series of fixed and written laws,
but people and their participation should be implemented for over-
coming contradictions. In this way, in addition to conflicts manage-
ment, social capital in rural communities is improved and local tradi-
tions and social institutions are regenerated (Bijani and Hayati, 2011).
6.3.4. Ensuring the transparency of public officials' performance in the
water sector through mass media
Interviewees stated that there should be some conditions in the
water sector where criticism and comments about the performance of
responsible authorities does not lead to punishment or retaliation, but is
rather seen as an opportunity to correct mistakes. They emphasized that
freedom of speech with regard to criticism and assessment of the per-
formance of public authorities and their policies in mass media plays a
crucial role in the promotion of accountability and transparency. Dunu
(2013) noted that institutions and governments should be accountable
and transparent for their policies and performance because according to
Ashraf (2014) people must know what their governments are doing.
Consequently, policy failures, maladministration, corruption, and
scandals in public administration and their related entities can be
highlighted through mass media in order to promote responsiveness
and transparency among all citizens (Ashraf, 2014). The fact is that all
aspects of good governance including accountability, transparency,
participation, rule of law, efficiency, effectiveness, etc. are facilitated by
using a strong, pluralistic, and independent media within the society
(Dunu, 2013).
7. Conclusion
The result showed that 28 out of 31 policy instruments identified
properly contribute to the improvement of the governance of Ab-ban-
dans. However, the enhancement of participation and collective action
among farmers due to the highest factor loading among all the instru-
ments in three dimensions is more contributed to the improvement of
water governance; therefore, it can be seen as the starting point for the
desired transformation. “Even if participation cannot be seen as the new
orthodoxy, it is clear that participation has become one of the central
influences in mainstream development thinking” (Parfitt, 2004: 537).
Consequently, farmers’ willingness to participate in management pro-
cesses and their collective action can be seen as a panacea for enhan-
cing the governance of Ab-bandans. To this end, the top-down paradigm
of government should be changed into a bottom-up paradigm and
participatory governance, and the government should undertake the
role of a facilitator rather than governmentality in the governance of
Ab-bandans. Moreover, the significant issue is that each dimension in
the improvement of the governance of Ab-bandans interacts with the
other dimensions; therefore, the policy instruments are interdependent
and shouldn’t be addressed in isolation. The improvement of the gov-
ernance of Ab-bandans should be systematic and it is not possible to
apply a single policy instrument without considering the impact of
other policy instruments. It is necessary to adopt the policy instruments
in a holistic way to solve difficulties in the governance of Ab-bandans.
This study has some limitations including the sample size in the
quantitative phase. Furthermore, water governance is strongly depen-
dent on context, Ab-bandans are just restricted to Northern Iran, so
these policy instruments cannot be generalized in respect of other areas
in Iran. Nevertheless, these instruments can be used as a basis for other
case studies in the country with reference to rivers, lakes, underground
waters.
Although the results of this study are a good starting point for
creating a positive change in the governance of Ab-bandans, further
research could be conducted to assess the ex-ante or ex-post effect of
each policy instrument in the improvement of the governance of Ab-
bandans. It calls for further data and analysis in which the viewpoints of
farmers can be covered.
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Abstract  
Water is the main resource required for the production of agricultural crops. Traditional water reservoirs called Ab-
bandan in the Mazandaran province, Northern Iran are used to collect precipitation for irrigating rice fields. However, 
the collective way of governing Ab-bandans by local communities is gradually disappearing. Although social capital 
is an important concept which facilities collective interaction of the local communities dealing with water management. 
This paper aims to explore how and why components of social capital (i.e. trust, co-operation, social network cohesion, 
leadership roles, and conflict resolution) among various local stakeholders influence the water reservoirs-related 
interactions. Qualitative method is carried out by using semi-structured, face-to-face interviews with a range of local 
key stakeholders of Ab-bandans (29 interviews). NVivo software is used to code the interview transcripts through the 
identification of relevant themes. The results show that leaders are the key individuals, who play a crucial leadership 
role in promoting and facilitating co-operation and conflict resolution. Conflicts within the communities are usually 
resolved by the leaders through negotiation and conciliation mechanisms. However, these mechanisms are only a 
temporary solution for conflict resolution between different local communities. The conflicts in water management 
have decreased social relationships within and between the communities. Collective water-related decisions often fail 
due to conflicts and difficulties in dialogue and debate among stakeholders. Overall, the level of social capital and its 
importance can differ depending on which component is under investigation. However, appropriate mechanisms for 
conflict resolution are the most important aspect of social capital which plays a significant role for the other 
components.  
Keywords: Water management, Leadership, Conflicts, Social cohesion, Co-operation, Trust, Mazandaran  
1. Introduction
Demand for water is increasing and the world is expected to face a 40% global water shortage by 2030 (UNESCO 
WWAP, 2015), this situation potentially leads to water wars around the world (Serageldin, 2009). Iran is located in an 
arid and semi-arid region of the world with an average annual precipitation of 228 mm which is 72% less than the 
global average of 814 mm (Karandish and Hoekstra, 2017). Due to poor water resource management in agriculture 
which consumes more than 90% of the water, there is a drastic water crisis in Iran (Karandish and Hoekstra, 2017). 
Many Iranian experts claim that the most significant cause of the water crisis is the failure in water governance (Foltz, 
2002), which includes managerial, political, and institutional problems (Madani, 2014). Water governance refers to 
“the range of political, social, economic, and administrative systems that are in place to develop and manage water 
resources, and the delivery of water services, at different levels of society” (Rogers and Hall, 2003: 16). Water 
governance involves a range of actors and structures in water policy formulation and implementation (Akhmouch and 
Correia, 2016), and includes a set of collective activities to secure the water systems viability and integrity and to 
achieve common goals with the help of diverse stakeholder groups (Wiek and Larson, 2012).  
The Mazandaran province located in Northern Iran has an annual average precipitation of 749.9 mm which is high in 
comparison with other provinces in the country (Ministry of Energy Iran, 2015). A considerable amount of the 
precipitation occurs during the non-growing seasons in autumn and winter (Azmoodeh et al., 2009). There are 
traditional water reservoirs in this province called Ab-bandan which are used to collect precipitation during the non-
growing seasons (Mirzaei et al., 2017; 2019). These were typically constructed by local farmers about 3000 years 
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ago, based on available materials and indigenous engineering knowledge by digging the land and compressing the 
soil to construct a wall around an excavated pond (Ejlali et al., 2012; Ghoddousi, 1999; Rahimi Farahani et al., 2012). 
Utilization and maintenance of these water reservoirs are carried out by local farmers for irrigation of rice fields 
(Vosoughi and Mohammadi, 2013). At the local level, other actors e.g. local leaders and fishermen, play an important 
role in the water reservoirs-related interactions (Mirzaei et al., 2017).  
There is evidence that the formerly relatively collective way of governing Ab-bandans within local communities is 
gradually disappearing which has led farmers to an increasing tendency towards seeking individual and short-term 
benefits and the withdrawal of more water than is actually available (Vosoughi and Mohammadi, 2013). Mirzaei et al. 
(2017) discussed the fact that farmers upstream and downstream of the water reservoirs, or even users of a common 
reservoir, claim ownership and utilization due to the uncertainty whether they have reliable access to the water; this 
leads to social conflicts and failure in the collective interaction within local communities. Valizadeh et al. (2018; 2019) 
highlighted that the present orientation of Iranian farmers is to maximize their water use with less attention to 
participatory behaviour which is considered as one of the most significant reasons for the emergence of water-resource 
problems. Local users’ success or failure in the governance of the common good of the community is directly 
interrelated with the ability of users to work together (Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick, 1995), which is called social 
capital (Putnam, 1995; Ostrom and Ahn, 2002). Social capital is “an attribute of individuals and their relationships that 
enhance their ability to solve collective-action problems” (Ostrom and Ahn, 2002: 4). Kelly et al. (2017) argued that 
social capital is an important factor which facilities collective interaction of the local community for water system 
sustainability.  
Therefore, this study explores aspects of social capital in the governance of Ab-bandans seeking explanations as to 
how and why components of social capital among various local stakeholders influence the water reservoirs-related 
interactions within the communities. Although there is scientific evidence related to social issues in water management 
in Iran, empirical research which specifically addresses components of social capital and their roles in the management 
of water reservoirs in the Mazandaran province has not been carried out. Therefore, this paper contributes to science 
by establishing empirical evidence for collective interaction based on social capital as a pre-condition for effective 
water governance at the local level. This paper has two aims: 1) To identify key components of social capital among 
local stakeholders of Ab-bandans; 2) To investigate how these components of social capital affect and relate to the 
governance of Ab-bandans.  
2. Theoretical background
The concept of governance is broader than government because it focuses not only on the state and formal institutions 
but also on social actors and engages various stakeholders from different sectors at the local, regional, national, and 
international levels (Bevir, 2013). Water governance addresses political, social, economic, and administrative 
dimensions at various levels to develop policies and institutions in the water sector (Rogers and Hall, 2003).  According 
to OECD (2015: 5), water governance is “the range of political, institutional and administrative rules, practices, and 
processes (formal and informal) through which decisions are taken and implemented, stakeholders can articulate their 
interests and have their concerns considered, and decision-makers are held accountable for water management”. 
Therefore, governance refers to all processes of governing, whether undertaken by the government or an informal 
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institution such as family, tribe, or the local community (Bevir, 2013). So, water governance is here defined as the 
capability of various social stakeholders to manage water resources in a collective manner at the local level (Solanes 
and Jouravlev, 2006). Effective water governance is not only related to the decisions of water managers and 
administrators to solve the water problems of today and the future, but also addresses how societies can manage their 
water resources in a wise manner (Hoekstra, 2011). 
The concept of social capital has been suggested as an important factor affecting governance and conversation of 
natural resources (Bodin and Crona, 2008). Social capital is defined as “networks, norms, and trust that enable 
participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives” (Putnam, 1995: 664). Fukuyama (1997, as 
cited in Adler and Kwon, 2002: 20) described social capital as “the existence of a certain set of informal values or 
norms shared among members of a group that permit co-operation among them”. Nahapiet and Ghoshal, (1998: 243) 
found social capital as “the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, available through, and derived 
from the network of relationships possessed by an individual or social unit”. Social capital is the missing link for 
development and this is what holds societies together (Grootaert, 1998). It is a resource that individuals stand to benefit 
from by virtue of membership in social networks, structures, and relations (Bisung and Elliott, 2014; Portes, 1998).  
Social capital as networks, norms of reciprocity, and trust provide a solution to the challenges of co-ordinated action 
for the effective management of common resources (Dahal and Adhikari, 2008). As social capital is a multidimensional 
concept (Claridge, 2004), based on the review of related literature, we considered five central components of social 
capital i.e. trust, co-operation, social network cohesion, leaders and their roles, and conflict resolution. Figure 1 
illustrates schematically these components which are assumed to be related to the governance of Ab-bandans within 
the local communities. 
Trust is a social capital component which could be relevant in a natural resource context. It refers to the extent to which 
people can rely on relatives, neighbours, colleagues, and even strangers for support and assistance (Dudwick et al., 
2006). Trust is “expectation or belief that one can rely on another person’s actions and word and/or that the person has 
good intentions toward oneself” (Dirks, 2000). General trust as well as trust in institutions constitutes an important 
aspect of social capital (Hunecke et al., 2017). General trust is defined as trust in people within the surrounding society 
e.g. family members, friends, neighbours, and colleagues (Hunecke et al., 2017). This is a vital aspect of social capital
which facilitates the communities’ governance and economic well-being (Yamagishi et al., 2015). Trust in institutions 
in water-related issues is about trust in government at different levels and its agencies, community officials, politicians, 
and associations (Hunecke et al., 2017; Narayan and Cassidy, 2001; Polyzou et al., 2011). Trust in government and 
public institutions as a significant principle in water governance leads to the involvement of all stakeholders through 
democracy and fairness for society (OECD, 2015).  
Co-operation is another critical component of social capital. The investigation of co-operation builds a deeper 
understanding of how people work with others within the community on a common project and/or how they respond 
collectively to a problem or crisis (Dudwick et al., 2006). Local participation and co-operation is an essential element 
for successful collective action and natural resource governance (Uphoff, 1999). Effective management of common 
resources is facilitated by the encouragement of co-operative behaviour to achieve collective goods (Anthony and 
Campbell, 2011). Local participation can be seen as a central issue for enhancing water governance and a co-operative 
manner in water-related processes can be beneficial both for local stakeholders and society (Mirzaei et al., 2019).  
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Social capital is also generated from social network cohesion and interactions. Therefore, research on social capital 
concentrates on interactions and networks. Social network cohesion is considered to be social connections and relations 
between societal units e.g., individuals, groups, and associations (Berger-Schmitt, 2000).  It is the vertical and 
horizontal interaction and connectedness among members of society which includes trust, a sense of belonging, and 
the willingness to participate in social activities (Chan et al., 2006). It can be seen in community events e.g. weddings 
and funerals or other activities which promote solidarity, communication, and a sense of collectiveness and 
consciousness (Dudwick et al., 2006). Fostering social relations among various stakeholders can increase the chances 
of collaboration and joint action (Bodin and Crona, 2009). These social interactions lead to the formation of groups 
and networks and so consequently the development of social capital (Leahy and Anderson, 2010).  
Bodin and Crona (2008) addressed leaders and influential actors as a latent stock of social capital which can produce 
a flow of benefits.  “Leadership can be understood as social capital that collects around certain individuals –whether 
formally designated as leaders or not- based on the acuity of their social perceptions and the structure of their social 
ties” (Balkundi and Kilduff, 2006: 421). Leaders are people who can form social networks within and between 
communities and play the role of legitimizers (often prominent citizens with prestige) and/or effectors (professionals 
or technicians) in society (Gray et al., 2005). They can share information, provide advice and support and have a great 
influence on collective action (Hoppe and Reinelt, 2010).   
Furthermore, mechanisms for conflict resolution are often thought to be an essential component for common resource 
management, but these mechanisms are rarely included in empirical studies of social capital (Bodin and Crona, 2008). 
Water can indirectly produce tension and conflict because it is a basic element in agriculture and the rural livelihoods 
are dependent on it (Carius et al., 2004). In most cases, water conflict is not due to the lack of water, but it is caused 
by the inefficient manner in which resources are governed (Carius et al., 2004). If these conflicts are constantly ignored, 
they intensify and exacerbate the degradation of natural resources, erosion of social and human capital and ultimately, 
result in problems for rural livelihoods (Sanginga et al., 2007). Therefore, in developing countries where the use of 
common resources is essential for rural livelihoods, applying strategies for peace building, conflict prevention, and 
long-term social-ecological resilience should be seen as prerequisites for successful natural resource management 
(Ratner et al., 2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4. Role of social capital 
 
47 
 
 
Fig. 1. Theoretical background guiding this research 
 
3. Study area and Ab-bandans  
This study was carried out in the province of Mazandaran, Northern Iran. Mazandaran is a geographical area of 24.000 
km2 (1.46% of the total area of Iran) and is adjoined to the Caspian Sea to the north and the Alborz Mountains to the 
south (Kheyroddin and Hedayatifard, 2017). This province extends between latitude 35° 46' and 36° 58' north and 
longitude 50° 21 and 54° 8' east (Shahbazi and Esmaeili-Sari, 2009) (Fig. 2). Mazandaran is geographically divided 
into two parts: The coastal plains and a mountainous area with an average temperature of 25° C in summer and 6° C 
in winter (Shahbazi and Esmaeili-Sari, 2009). It has a high production capacity for agriculture due to the humid 
temperate climate and suitable soil (Khoshbakht and Hammer, 2006). Moreover, 37% (199,000 ha) of the land in 
Mazandaran is used for rice cultivation which is the staple food in Iran and Ab-bandans are the most important water 
resources for irrigating rice fields during the growing seasons (Ministry of Agriculture Iran, 2016). Ab-bandans are 
man-made ‘water reservoirs’ or ‘artificial wetland’ with different sizes ranging from 3 to 1000 hectares (Abbasian et 
al., 2014). There are 880 Ab-bandans in Mazandaran with an area of around 17,000 hectares and depths varying from 
1.5 m to 4 m (Mazandaran Regional Water Authority, 2016). They are multi-functional and can play a significant role 
in recharging underground water and wells, collecting drainage water, aquaculture, habitat for birds and plants, and 
attracting tourism (Salabi, 2010) (Fig. 3). 
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     Fig. 2. Geographical position of the study area 
     Adopted from Karandish and Hoekstra (2017) 
       Fig. 3. A water reservoir in Mazandaran Province 
       Image provided by the first author   
4. Methodology
The qualitative research approach was applied to investigate key social capital components affecting the governance 
of Ab-bandans among local stakeholders in the Mazandaran province, Northern Iran. Qualitative research provides 
findings based on understanding peoples’ everyday lives and their viewpoints under different circumstances (Yin, 
2016), and it is suitable when researchers want to recognize the “why” behind people’s behaviour or actions 
(Rosenthal, 2016).  
In this research, semi-structured, face-to-face interviews were conducted from July to mid-September 2018. Interviews 
were performed with a range of local key stakeholders who are directly related to Ab-bandans i.e. farmers, fishermen, 
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informal leaders (elders, Mirab, farmers’ representatives), and official leaders (members of rural councils) who have 
been formally elected by the villagers. The wide range of stakeholders involved, achieved a rich image of the views of 
the people and thus increased the credibility of the research (Shenton, 2004). Three different Ab-bandans/villages were 
selected according to the previous research experience of the first author with the study site (Table 1). Initially, 
interviews began with a set of stakeholders who were known to the researchers (i.e. purposive sampling), and then a 
snowball sampling approach was used to identify additional interviewees who also had experience, ability, and 
readiness to provide the required data (Rosenthal, 2016). The researchers continued sampling and interviewing until 
the data revealed that there were no new insights on the subject under investigation (Charmaz, 2006). Indeed, achieving 
theoretical saturation is a criterion of data validity (Elo et al., 2014). Ultimately, 29 local stakeholders were 
interviewed, all these interviewees were male (Table 1). The main stakeholders of Ab-bandans are men; therefore, 
women’s perception as indirect stakeholders was not addressed. 
   Table 1 Description of selected Ab-bandans and local stakeholders interviewed 
Ab-bandan/village 
name 
Shorthand 
Local stakeholders 
Farmers Fishermen Informal leaders Official leaders 
Panbeh Zar Kooti PZK 4 1 4 2 
Gol Neshin GN 4 1 2 2 
Abasali Kash AK 3 1 3 2 
        Total ꞊ 29 11 3 9 6 
During the interviews, participants gave their oral consent and received information on their voluntary participation, 
protection and confidentiality of the research data. In addition, participants were informed that they could withdraw 
from the interview at any time (Flick, 2009; Forsgren et al., 2016). Interviews were conducted and recorded by two 
members of the research team (the first and fourth author) in dialogue form and for an average of 60 minutes. The 
interviewers had the advantage of being familiar with the native language, so that they were able to communicate 
directly with the local stakeholders. In addition, the interviewers recorded their observations and impressions about 
each interview during the research (Hancock et al., 2009).  
The interview questions were primarily open-ended which provided opportunities for both interviewer and interviewee 
to have a detailed discussion of the topic under investigation (Hancock et al., 2009). Before final application, the 
interview guide questions were tested among several Ph.D. students, as well as local stakeholders, to identify any 
potentially unclear and biased questions (Rosenthal, 2016). The interviews began with an opening question and 
continued with a range of related questions following an interview guide (Table 2). The researchers encouraged the 
interviewees to provide more detailed information by asking short questions such as ‘Can you explain more?’, ‘What 
do you mean?’, and ‘Can you give an example of your experience?’ 
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Table 2 Interview guide 
Opening question Guide questions Follow up questions 
Could you please tell us a bit 
about your Ab-bandan? 
How do you see trust among different 
stakeholders in your community?  
To whom do you go when you need 
cash to solve your financial problem? 
How do the rural councils and public 
authorities work?  
To what extent do people collaborate 
with one another in the issues related to 
Ab-bandan?  
How are the decisions related to Ab-
bandan taken? How is the role and 
involvement of individuals in the 
decision-making process? Do you 
contribute if the government demands 
your financial or physical participation 
for Ab-bandan?  
How is your interaction with 
individuals in your community? 
In which events do people come 
together?  
Who plays a leadership or mobilizing 
role regarding Ab-bandan? 
How are the leaders selected? What are 
the main characteristic and role and 
responsibilities of leaders? 
Do you experience any conflicts in your 
community regarding Ab-bandan? 
Who are the key actors involved in the 
conflicts? What are the frequency, 
intensity, and duration of conflicts? 
What are the causes of conflicts? How 
do you resolve these conflicts? Have 
these worked?  
Data from this research study included interview transcripts and field notes from observations. All the recorded 
interviews were transcribed verbatim. Data was analyzed by the same researchers who conducted and transcribed the 
interviews. NVivo software (version 10) was used to code the transcripts through the identification of relevant themes, 
concepts, ideas, and relationships. As Sutton and Austin (2015) noted “this process enables the researcher to begin to 
understand the world from each participant’s perspective”. After coding the data independently, the two researchers 
presented and discussed any similarities and differences in their codes and reached decisions on final themes. This 
process resulted in the revision of the codes and helped to clarify and confirm the research findings (Sutton and Austin, 
2015). We highlighted the results with direct quotes from the interviewees and the researchers’ interpretations of the 
themes and concepts.  
5. Findings
5.1 Leaders and leadership roles 
The results from all three villages indicated that the official leaders of Ab-bandans are actors who play a key role in 
decision-making and planning related to local water management. The official leaders are a group of 3 to 5 people 
(five members in villages with more than 1,500 inhabitants), who have been formally elected by the villagers for a 
period of four years. These official leaders are called rural council (Shura) and are legal representatives of the 
government in the villages. According to Iran’s constitution (article 100), “for the quick promotion of social, economic, 
development, health, cultural, educational, and welfare programs, the administration of each village must be carried 
out under the supervision of a rural council”. Therefore, all activities related to local water management have to be 
made with the approval and under supervision of the rural councils e.g. attempts to obtain budgets from the regional 
government for the rehabilitation of Ab-bandans, plans to lease Ab-bandans to any qualified person for aquaculture, 
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dredging of canals, farm routes improvement etc. The rural councils also play a role in motivating co-operation among 
farmers for collective action in the villages. For example, the collection and mobilizing of money, labour, and 
equipment needed for dredging the canals takes place under the order and co-ordination of the rural councils. Minor 
conflicts among farmers are also resolved by the rural councils.  
In addition, elders, Mirab, and farmers’ representatives are informal leaders in the villages. The elders enjoy influence 
and are socially respected people in rural society. They are trust-worthy persons who, together with the rural councils, 
mediate among farmers in order to solve disagreements. Farmers bring their claims to the elders and rural councils for 
judgment, and they respect and enforce their mandates.  
Mirab, the water master also co-operates with the rural councils in the management of Ab-bandans. At the beginning 
of each growing season, two or more individuals are selected by farmers as Mirab. Under the supervision of the rural 
councils, they are responsible for storing water in the reservoirs during the rainy seasons, maintenance of the reservoirs, 
and distribution of water among farmers in the growing seasons. The use of water in rice fields is carried out in co-
operation with the farmers. So, when each farmer has completed irrigation, they are obliged to direct the water to the 
adjoining field, this is supervised by the Mirab, so that the rice fields are irrigated in turn. At the end of the growing 
season, Mirab receives a portion of the farmers’ crop in payment (6 kg rice per hectare), but sometimes these fees are 
paid in cash. The presence of Mirab is very important for the fair distribution of water among farmers, especially in 
dry years.  
Farmers’ representatives are also actors related to Ab-bandans who are influential, experienced, reliable, and well-
known farmers, who usually represent different family groups. These people usually associate with the rural councils 
in decision-making and resolution of conflicts among farmers and the important decisions about Ab-bandans are 
usually legitimated in agreement with this group.  
Summarizing the various activities and roles attributed to the leaders (table 3), it seems that members of the rural 
councils as official leaders play a more important role in legitimization and implementation of water-related decisions 
than the informal leaders due to their legal authority. 
    Table 3 Sub-categories identified in the component of leaders and their roles 
Category Sub-category Description 
Leaders 
and their 
roles 
The role of rural councils with regard 
to Ab-bandans  
• Decision-making and implementation of
water-related decisions
• Attracting farmers’ participation
• Resolving minor everyday conflicts among
farmers
Influence of elders • Mediation in solving minor conflicts
among farmers
The role of Mirab • Storing water during rainy seasons in the
water reservoirs
• Maintenance of the water reservoirs
• Distribution of water among farmers
during the growing seasons
Co-operation of farmers’ 
representatives in water management 
• Legitimize decisions
• Resolution of conflicts among farmers
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5.2 Conflict resolution  
The results from the villages investigated showed that there are different conflicts among local stakeholders within the 
communities. One interviewee from PZK explained that “The conflicts between farmers are ordinary and inevitable. 
For example, a farmer may cultivate a common border between his farm and the adjacent one to produce more crops 
which leads to protest from the neighbouring farmer”. One interviewee from GN also stated that “Conflicts among 
farmers are exacerbated with water scarcity. Last night a farmer wanted to steal water. He secretly attempted to alter 
the flow of water into his farm”. The interviewees noted that in rural areas, norms are more effective than legal rules; 
therefore, the majority of the contradictions and claims among farmers are usually resolved through the intervention 
of rural councils and informal leaders.   
Using the potential of Ab-bandans for fish breeding also creates a conflict between the fishermen and farmers. One 
fisherman remarked that “My fish are dying. When they come to the margins of the reservoirs, they get stuck there 
because the water level is too low. Therefore, they cannot return to the reservoirs”.  Although the revenues from the 
lease of Ab-bandans are used for maintenance and protection of the reservoirs and development of the rural area, when 
there is a shortage of water, farmers prefer to withdraw more water from Ab-bandans. But the fishermen prevent the 
farmers from doing so because that would be a threat for their fish. The rural councils try to manage this conflict in a 
friendly way by meeting and negotiating between the fishermen and farmers. However, sometimes the fishermen sue 
the public authorities in order to find a solution to the problem.  
There are opposite views and disagreements not only among the members of the rural councils, but also among this 
group and farmers’ representatives, so that each person or group wants to enforce their own opinion. These conflicts 
are usually resolved through negotiation and conciliation, but grudges remain on both sides.   
There are not only conflicts within the local communities, but also between different communities and these are more 
intense. The interviews in GN showed that there is a serious conflict between farmers in this community and the 
upstream village. The winter runoff passes through the upstream village in order to enter and be stored in the Ab-
bandan in GN. However, local people in the upstream village have changed the water route and they do not allow 
storage of water in the reservoir. One interviewee from GN explained that “This conflict goes back to a long-standing 
grudge among our grandfathers which has been passed on to their children and grandchildren and has continued until 
now”.  
Farmers from AK should obtain part of their required water from a common Ab-bandan located in the adjacent village. 
However, the farmers in the adjacent village prevent the AK farmers using the water. “The water war among us started 
many years ago. They (people in the adjacent village) are mostly young and say that this water belongs to them, and 
that they would prefer to use it for fish breeding. But since ancient of days, we have been using this water for 
agriculture” (Interviewee from AK). These conflicts sometimes lead to mass violence, and local meetings, 
negotiations, and conciliation are only short-term, temporary mechanisms to solve these problems. The interviewees 
stated that there is no local mechanism to resolve disputes between different communities and so they are referred to 
the public authorities e.g. government agencies related to water management, court, police; but these disputes still 
remain unresolved over many years.  
The government has not only failed to resolve the conflicts between different local communities, but it is also part of 
the conflicts. There is a conflict between the farmers from PZK and the government at the regional level. The 
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government claims that according to the water law, all water resources belong to the government and therefore they 
are the main decision-makers for administration, authorization, and control of the water reservoirs. One interviewee 
from PZK pointed out that “Our Ab-bandan is near the main road, it is a good place for leisure and recreation 
activities, and would be an attraction for tourists. Therefore, the government claims ownership and wants to decide 
independently in regard to the different projects in our Ab-bandan. However, this Ab-bandan has been in our village 
for hundreds of years and our grandfathers built it, therefore, we are the real owners. It is our asset and we want to 
make this decision independently”. Due to the geographical location and various economic potentialities, it seems that 
this Ab-bandan has been considered by the government at the regional level. Villagers are afraid of losing their 
resources which they have been using for agricultural purposes over generations and if they lose this, they will lose 
their livelihood. Another interviewee from PZK highlighted that “In one of the villages in Mazandaran, the government 
undertook the administration of Ab-bandan and claimed ownership. Gradually they changed the use of Ab-bandan 
and built a residential complex there”. This dispute has been brought to court over many years and as long as this 
conflict is not resolved, farmers are not allowed to use the water for other functions except irrigation. Table (4) provides 
a summary of various conflicts and the mechanisms for resolution in the research area.  
    Table 4 Sub-categories identified in the component of conflict resolution 
Category Sub-category Description 
Conflict 
resolution 
Resolving conflicts within the 
communities: 
- among farmers
- among fishermen and farmers
- among leaders
• Mediation of the rural councils and informal
leaders by local meetings, negotiations, and
conciliation
• Negotiation and conciliation among leaders
Resolving conflicts between different 
communities 
• No local mechanism
Resolving conflicts between 
communities and government 
• Remaining unresolved over many years
5.3 Social network cohesion 
Although interactions and relationships in the villages have decreased in the past years, still weddings, funerals, and 
religious ceremonies are held in a collective manner. Many described that the villagers support each other in difficult 
circumstances such as sickness and death. For example, if someone loses one of their family members, all the villagers 
go to their house as a group to offer their condolences and they try to pay the funeral expenses jointly. Therefore, most 
of the communication and visits between local stakeholders within and between the communities occur as the group 
events.  
However, many of these events are affected by conflicts in water management. For example, consideration to the 
religious values is one of the most effective elements in relationships and solidarity within and between local 
communities. But this religious solidarity is being reduced due to conflicts in water management. In the villages 
investigated, the local people gather in mosques and religious places and carry out the related customs and practices 
collectively during Ramadan (month of fasting) and Muharram (the first month of the Islamic calendar). However, one 
interviewee from PZK explained that “This year during Ramadan, some people did not come to the mosque because 
they had some problems with the rural councils regarding water-related issues”. Another interviewee from AK also 
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suffers from the mounting division between different communities; he said “Every year during the Muharram, our 
neighboring village used to come to our village to perform the associated rituals. But this year, they didn’t come and 
our annual religious ceremonies were cancelled due to the contradictions in association with Ab-bandan”. So, these 
conflicts and disagreements in water management have disrupted the group events and social network cohesion. Table 
(5) shows a brief description of the component of social network cohesion.
    Table 5 Sub-categories identified in the component of social network cohesion 
Category Sub-category Description 
Social 
network 
cohesion 
Social interactions and relationships 
• Participation in group events such as
weddings, funerals, and religious
ceremonies and performing them in a
collective manner
• Consideration of the religious values
5.4 Co-operation
The results from all three villages indicated that the issues related to Ab-bandans e.g. dredging, reparation, and 
maintenance are conducted with the co-operation of farmers. This co-operation takes place in the form of collection of 
money, providing equipment and machinery needed, and manual labour. For example, the rural councils invite farmers 
to participate in cleaning canals as a labour force. Although all farmers may not be present, dredging will be ultimately 
conducted with the people who are available. Farmers who are absent must participate in other related activities upon 
request of the rural councils.  
The results also showed that decision-making in all villages is officially the responsibility of the rural councils. 
However, important decisions such as the lease of Ab-bandans are made collectively with the participation of 
stakeholders. For example, water reservoirs are being auctioned for aquaculture by the rural councils. Afterwards, the 
rural councils invite people to a meeting in the mosque to select a qualified person from among various candidates 
(this person can be from inside or outside of the village) as the winner of the auction. All interested stakeholders can 
attend this meeting and the decisions are taken based on majority voting. Finally, all the people are informed of the 
decision through a megaphone in the villages or social media. Collective decision-making is very difficult due to 
conflicts and opposite views, and it requires a lot of time and energy. This leads to delays in making decisions and 
their implementation. One interviewee from PZK reported that “The public meetings are not efficient because there 
are too many comments which cause conflicts among different groups. Those people (usually farmers’ representative), 
who are against the rural councils give comments based on their personal hostility. This leads to a delay in decision- 
making, longer meetings or even cancellation of meetings”.  
Many interviewees stated that they are willing to actively participate in projects for solving water problems in co-
operation with government agencies involved in water management. For example, they are willing to participate 
financially and physically in canal lining and rehabilitation of Ab-bandans. According to interviewees, in case of 
implementation of these projects, it would be possible to prevent water loss, store more water, and use the water 
reservoirs for other functions. Table (6) illustrates different sub-categories identified in the component of co-operation. 
Chapter 4. Role of social capital 
55 
    Table 6 Sub-categories identified in the component of co-operation 
Category Sub-category Description 
Co-operation 
Farmers’ co-operation in dredging and 
maintenance of Ab-bandans 
• Collection of money, providing equipment
and machinery needed, and manual labour
Making decisions related to Ab-
bandans   
• Performing meetings with the participation
of stakeholders
Farmers’ willingness to co-operate 
with government agencies for solving 
water problems 
• Financial and physical co-operation for
canal lining and rehabilitation of Ab-
bandans
5.5 Trust  
The results indicated that in case of financial difficulties, interviewees firstly ask their family and relatives and then 
friends and neighbours. However, they described that the trust network among people has collapsed in the past years 
due to economic difficulties, the reduction of relationships, and negative experiences in the past. One interviewee from 
PZK expressed that “Trust among people existed before our houses were fenced off”. Although general trust in case of 
financial difficulties within the communities is relatively high, the trust of the local stakeholders in rural councils has 
reduced dramatically.  
According to the results, although the members of rural councils are elected by the people, they distrust them and are 
pessimistic with regard to financial matters. The rural councils do not give feedback regularly and financial statements 
on how to spend the revenues from the lease of Ab-bandans, or their reports do not have the required transparency. 
According to one interviewee from PZK “The rural council does not spend all the money on the village, they keep 
some of it and present false invoices”. The interviewees argued that farmers do not make an effort to request and 
receive regular reports. “People are just talking about the rural council but they do not demand a direct explanation 
about what they do with the money” (Interviewee from GN). The farmers ignore requests for reporting because of 
family ties, in addition, they are too busy with everyday life and its problems and do not have time to question the rural 
councils and request reports. However, the rural councils are legally obliged to report to the public. 
The eligibility of candidates for the rural councils’ election is determined by the relevant government bodies, but there 
is not much rigor in determining competencies and a lot of the criteria are ignored when choosing the candidates. 
Additionally, family relationships are more important than merit for the election of the rural councils within the 
communities. Villagers try to vote for their own relatives, as a result, any candidate who belongs to a larger tribe has 
more votes. One interviewee from GN said that “People want to send their relatives to the rural council so that they 
can use their family connections for more support”. The candidates gather votes among poor and low-income groups 
within the community by donating money or food. 
Local stakeholders also protested about the government at the regional level because they overlook or postpone their 
promises such as canal lining and rehabilitation projects of the water reservoirs and this causes distrust. One 
interviewee from AK emphasized that “The government officials are thinking of their own pocket rather than farmers. 
We have reservoirs in this area which are filled with water in winter time and the extra water flows into the sea and is 
wasted. But, the government does not make any arrangements for storing this extra water”. If dredging and 
rehabilitation would be carried out, more water could be stored in Ab-bandans during the rainy season and other 
resources such as a dam or well would not be necessary to irrigate the rice fields. Another interviewee from AK also 
argued that “Water canals are constructed with soil. If the government conducts the project of canal lining, water will 
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not be wasted, and then there will be enough water for both irrigation and fish breeding. In my opinion, there is no 
water shortage; we ourselves are the cause of it”. The members of the rural councils are also dissatisfied with the 
government’s promises as well as the long-term administrative procedure.  
Interviewees distrust the parliament’s representatives from the region. According to them, the political representatives 
gather votes in the region through advertisements and promises to solve problems such as rehabilitation of the 
reservoirs and resolution of disputes among communities; however, once they are elected in the parliament they don’t 
fulfill their promises. One interviewee from GN argued that “The representatives, despite their promises, do not make 
an effort to resolve disputes among us and the upstream village. They are too afraid of losing the votes of upstream 
people for the next round because they have a larger population than us”. Table (7) shows the result of villages 
investigated regarding the component of trust.  
    Table 7 Sub-categories identified in the component of trust 
Category Sub-category Description 
Trust 
Trust among local stakeholders in case 
of financial needs 
• Relying firstly on family and relatives,
then friends and neighbors
The rural councils accountability • Lack of reporting regularly
• Low transparency in the reports
Transparency in the process of the rural 
councils’ election 
• Low accuracy in determining 
competencies
• Election of the rural councils based on
family relationships
The government performance at the 
regional level 
• Dissatisfaction with the government’s
promises
The trust of local stakeholders in the 
parliament’s representatives 
• Dissatisfaction with the promises of
parliament’s representatives for solving
water problems
6. Discussion
This study provides a detailed picture of the role of social capital components in the governance of Ab-bandans by the 
local key stakeholders i.e. farmers, fishermen, informal leaders (elders, Mirab, farmers’ representatives), and rural 
councils. We considered five central social capital components i.e. trust, co-operation, social network cohesion, leaders 
and leadership roles, and conflict resolution. We discuss these components below.   
We found that elders, farmers’ representatives, Mirab, and especially rural councils are the key individuals and leaders 
who play a crucial leadership role in promoting and facilitating collective action in the utilization and management of 
Ab-bandans through co-operation and conflict resolution. They can decrease the water-related problems through 
mediation and negotiation within the community and manage local conflicts through customary laws and norms 
derived from ethical, social, and religious values. The results also indicate that the rural councils play a more important 
role in the management of Ab-bandans than the informal leaders due to their legal authority. In contrast, Bodin and 
Crona (2008) found that leaders who are elected traditionally, have a central and powerful position in the village and 
are firmly attached to village social networks in comparison with formally elected leaders with official authority. Dahal 
and Dev Bhatta (2008) demonstrated that leaders solve the problems in the interest of both sides through assessment 
of the causes of conflicts, engagement in arguments, exchange of information, and identification of the common points. 
They play a significant role in convincing people to take collective action and making culprits aware of their mistakes 
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(Dahal and Dev Bhatta, 2008). Local leadership can “mobilize energies, generate trust, give vision, and support the 
collective finding of a clear direction in a multiparty process” (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2007: 8).  
Conflicts within the communities could be resolved by leaders through mediation, negotiation, and conciliation. 
However, these local mechanisms are not effective in the prevention of conflicts and mass violence between different 
local communities in regard to water usage. It seems that an institutionally more comprehensive approach is required. 
Increasing disputes and lack of appropriate solutions lead to the reduction of social interactions and relationships for 
the utilization and maintenance of Ab-bandans.  
It is interesting to note that many interviewees argued that intervention and facilitation by public authorities is 
necessary to solve the conflicts between different communities. However, government agencies related to water 
management have not only failed to provide an appropriate mechanism for resolving conflicts, but they are also part 
of the conflicts due to their preferences for independent and top-down decision-making and planning for Ab-bandans. 
The government agencies related to water management would prefer to act as an administrator rather than a facilitator 
in the management of Ab-bandans. As water is a public commodity in Iran and the government is the owner and 
manager (Hayati and Bijani, 2011), neutral intervention by the public authorities through facilitation and strengthening 
of the culture of dialogue and negotiation can be seen as a policy mechanism for conflict resolution in the management 
of Ab-bandans (Mirzaei et al., 2019). Tyler (1999) concluded that government policies in conflict management enable 
local stakeholders to act successfully in assessing their needs, negotiating and discussing with other users, evaluating 
the technical quality of resources, and reaching consensus-based solutions.  
According to the results, many ceremonies in the villages are performed collectively and people try to keep their local 
values and customs. These local ceremonies and group events could be a way for people to come together and address 
common issues related to their Ab-bandans. But many social interactions and relationships within and between the 
communities, and the willingness to carry out local ceremonies, have been reduced due to the conflicts in water 
utilization. This leads to a reduction of opportunities for participatory action and communication within and between 
the communities in order to solve common problems related to their Ab-bandans. Relationships in social networks can 
improve collaborative governance through the generation and diffusion of environmental knowledge, mobilization and 
allocation of key resources for effective governance, commitment to the common rules among actors, and dispute 
resolution (Bodin and Crona, 2009). It is important to note that social ties within local communities foster trust, mutual 
assistance, and ultimately social relationships and cohesion which are essential for consensus building and conflict 
resolution in the governance of natural resources. Social ties between local communities play a critical role in access 
to any external resources and encouragement of collective action (Bodin and Crona, 2009).  
Co-operation of farmers in water-related activities takes place in the form of the collection of money, providing 
equipment and machinery needed, and manual labour. Water reservoirs-related decisions are also made collectively 
with the participation of stakeholders who are interested in the involvement of water-related meetings. Although the 
co-operation of each farmer in decision-making is useful for collective management and leads to the more legitimacy 
of decisions, in practice, most farmers participate in the decision-making process through their representatives, and so 
not all are involved. However, often collective water-related decisions do not reach a definitive conclusion and the 
main subject of the meetings may be forgotten due to conflicts and difficulties in dialogue and debate among the local 
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stakeholders. This leads to the failure of decision-making and planning for the water reservoirs in a co-operative 
manner.  
We found that local stakeholders are eager to collaborate with government agencies related to water management. It 
can be seen as an opportunity for government agencies to consider the willingness of farmers and ask them for their 
ideas on the management of Ab-bandans. Co-operation of stakeholders with government agencies and the utilization 
of their knowledge for solving water problems could have a significant impact on the sense of belonging and 
willingness to participate in the management of Ab-bandans.  
Although general trust within the communities is relatively high, farmers trust in the rural councils has been reduced 
due to the lack of accountability and transparency. The rural councils act as a grassroots institution and play an effective 
leadership role in the water sector progress through decision-making and planning for the water reservoirs, motivating 
farmers for participation, and using the other leaders within the community. However, lack of transparency in the 
process of the rural councils’ election and lack of reports and information regarding how Ab-bandans revenues are 
used, has greatly reduced the local trust in the rural councils. Transparency in the processes and accountability of rural 
councils could play a key role in building trust within the communities. This is a necessary aspect for solving collective 
action problems in activities related to water reservoirs. The presence of accountable and transparent rural councils as 
the most important leaders within the communities could contribute to successful water management. Furthermore, 
trust in the government and political representatives has been ruined over the years due to their failure to keep promises 
that they have made. It is important to note that the local trust in the government and its agents can increase the 
motivation of stakeholders to provide solutions aligned with territorial specificities for overcoming water problems. 
Mirzaei et al. (2019) described that farmers can trust the government and its agents when they see that their needs 
regarding the usage and maintenance of Ab-bandans is the main concern of the government as an administrator of 
water management.  
7. Conclusion
The findings achieved in this study contribute to current literature regarding the role of social capital components 
seeking a collective way of governing Ab-bandans among local stakeholders. Social capital components at the local 
level play an effective role in the management of Ab-bandans. Certainly, neglecting the social capital components (i.e. 
trust, co-operation, social network cohesion, leaders and their roles, and conflict resolution) leads to the failure of 
collective action in the management of water reservoirs.  
This study shows that the level of social capital and its importance can differ depending on which component is under 
investigation. For example, while many events are held jointly within and between the communities which indicates a 
high level of social relationships in group events, the use of mediation, negotiation, and conciliation mechanisms by 
leaders, to resolve conflicts between different communities, is only a temporary solution. It seems that appropriate 
mechanisms for conflict resolution are the most important aspect of social capital which plays a significant role for the 
other components. According to the results, social relationships and cohesion are being reduced due to the conflicts in 
water management and lack of appropriate mechanisms for resolution. Furthermore, conflicts and disagreements lead 
to the failure of collective interaction among local stakeholders in water reservoirs-related decision-making and 
planning. Therefore, resolution of conflicts can bring people together in group events to communicate and address 
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their common issues and promote their co-operation in public meetings for collective decision-making and planning. 
The government can play a key role in conflict resolution at the local level as it is in charge of water management in 
Iran. The government could undertake the role of a facilitator rather than governmentality, by using participatory 
governance for decision-making, planning, and resolving conflicts.  
However, the results of the study support the idea that the management of Ab-bandans in a collective manner at the 
local level in the Mazandaran province, needs to take all components of social capital into consideration. Therefore, a 
better understanding of social capital components influences stakeholders' participation in the collaborative governance 
of water reservoirs and is vital to help policymakers to design programmes for water usage and management. The 
government should establish effective strategies of water governance to empower and integrate local stakeholders, so 
that they are able to solve their water-related problems independently. This would enable local communities to be more 
resilient in the face of collective action problems.  
Although the result of this research is only restricted to the villages investigated, and cannot be generalized in respect 
of other Ab-bandans, it can be used as a basis for other related studies in the Mazandaran province. The focus of this 
research was not to discuss exogenous factors e.g. quantitative and qualitative reduction of water, sudden droughts, 
increased cultivation, international sanctions etc. Although we assume that these factors are catalyzers of the water 
crisis, not the main factor, this does not mean that social capital alone will be sufficiently successful in the governance 
of Ab-bandans.   
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5 Discussion and Conclusion 
  
As seen in the chapters 2, 3 and 4, this PhD research explored the governance of water reservoirs in the Mazandaran 
province, Northern Iran, from the perspective of public and private sectors at the regional level, as well as local 
stakeholders within the communities. This research aims to identify and assess gaps in the public governance of Ab-
bandans as well as seeking relevant policy instruments for overcoming these gaps in order to attain effective public 
water governance. In addition, this research investigated the role of social capital components in the governance of 
Ab-bandans in a collective manner at the local level. This concluding chapter summarizes the main findings and 
discussions, limitations, significance and contribution of the research, and policy recommendations.   
 
5.1 Summary of the main results and discussion   
The identification of challenges in the governance of Ab-bandans showed that the most acute gap, of all the gaps 
identified, is the lack of a specific law for Ab-bandans. The absence of a law for Ab-bandans in the country's water 
law leads to other gaps e.g., unclear ownership, conflicts, financial problems, and lack of environmental guidelines 
and technical instructions. As Navabi (2017) mentioned water-related laws in Iran have gradually lost their legal 
effectiveness. Fani et al. (2016) revealed major challenges in water resources in Iran which are affected by the 
geographic location, natural conditions in Iran and anthropogenic and management issues. Natural factors such as the 
lack of precipitation cannot be controlled by humans, but with proper management, most of the shortcomings could be 
eliminated. The most important problem in the management of water resources is the lack of enforcement of recognized 
legal cases related to water. The water-related laws of the country show that, in most cases, the existing laws are not 
fully implemented. Lack of long-term and strategic planning, low recognition of Ab-bandans at the national level, an 
unstable and insignificant budget from the central government, lack of water user associations, and absence of the use 
of technology are other important gaps in the governance of Ab-bandans.  
It is important to note that water governance challenges are often interrelated and can exacerbate each other (OECD, 
2011). There is interdependence among the identified gaps. The lack of sufficient budgeting from the central 
government (funding gap) results, not only in the lack of a specific law for Ab-bandans (policy gap), but also low 
recognition of Ab-bandans at the national level (administrative gap). Furthermore, due to insufficient budgeting 
(funding gap) and the lack of monitoring and evaluation of the rehabilitation of Ab-bandans (accountability gap), the 
water reservoirs face technical defects (capacity gap). Therefore, a holistic perspective is needed to understand and 
resolve the governance gaps of Ab-bandans. There is no magic or ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach (OECD, 2011) to 
overcome the gaps and a mixture of solutions are necessary.   
Multiple policy instruments identified in this research properly contribute to the improvement of the governance of 
Ab-bandans. Among all the policy instruments, the enhancement of participation and collective action among farmers 
make the most important contribution to the improvement of water governance. “Even if participation cannot be seen 
as the new orthodoxy, it is clear that participation has become one of the central influences in mainstream development 
thinking” (Parfitt, 2004: 537).   
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Furthermore, all the policy instruments are interdependent and should not be addressed separately. The improvement 
of the governance of Ab-bandans should be systematic; it is not possible to apply a single policy instrument without 
considering the impact of other policy instruments. There is a necessity to adopt the policy instruments in a holistic 
way to solve difficulties in the governance of Ab-bandans.  
Sustainable integration of water resources is not only dependent on formal institutional factors e.g. legislation and 
organizational structure, but also refers to the ability of the social system to mobilize energies in a coherent manner 
(Solanes and Jouravlev, 2006). The result showed that various local stakeholders are failing to manage Ab-bandans in 
a collective manner at the local level, due to challenges in the issues related to social capital components. We found 
that the management of Ab-bandans in a collective manner at the local level has to take all components of social capital 
into consideration. This would enable local communities to be more resilient in the face of collective action problems. 
Appropriate mechanisms for conflict resolution are the most important aspect of social capital and play a significant 
role for the other components. Resolution of conflicts could bring people together in group events to communicate and 
address their common issues and promote their co-operation in public meetings to attain collective decision-making 
and planning. Musavengane and Simatele (2017) pointed out that several key social capital components including 
fairness of rules, dispute resolution procedures, inclusivity, sociability, and open dialogue are important for the 
acquisition stakeholder participation in community-based resource management schemes.   
Overall, it can be concluded that managing water reservoirs in the Mazandaran province requires collaborative efforts 
between various stakeholders within and between the local communities. Consequently, local stakeholders must be 
empowered and encouraged to identify water-related problems in their communities and be able to design and develop 
strategies to address these problems. Therefore, a better understanding of social capital dimensions influences 
stakeholder participation in collaborative management of water reservoirs and is vital to help policy-makers to design 
programmes for water usage and management, which would be more attractive to local stakeholders. The government 
should undertake the role of facilitator, by using participatory and bottom-up processes for decision-making, planning, 
and resolving conflicts among local stakeholders. The government should establish effective strategies of governance 
to engage farmers in management decisions, to empower and integrate them, so that they are able to solve their water-
related problems independently. There is also an urgent need for co-operation and participation not only between local 
stakeholders and responsive public agencies at the regional level, but also among public agencies in charge of water 
policy design and implementation. As the government is the owner and manager of water resources, better management 
and utilization of Ab-bandans can only succeed if accompanied by a shift in public governance through the involvement 
of all relevant actors. 
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5.2 Limitations and research outlook  
Methodological challenges should be mentioned as a limitation of the research. According to the terminology in the 
Delphi method, the participants who are involved in the research (first paper) are called ‘experts’. Therefore, the results 
are ‘experts consensus’, and that does not necessarily mean that the ‘best’ or ‘correct’ responses have been found. 
Furthermore, construct validity of the results (second paper) can be increased by involving a larger sample of 
participants in the quantitative phase of the research.   
Also, this research is limited to the water reservoirs in the Mazandaran province, Northern Iran. So, the results cannot 
be generalized in respect of other areas in Iran.  Nevertheless, the findings can be used as a basis for other case studies 
in the country with reference to rivers, lakes, and underground waters.   
Although the policy instruments identified for improving the governance of Ab-bandans are a good starting point for 
creating a positive change in the governance of Ab-bandans, further research could also be conducted to assess the ex-
ante or ex-post effect of each policy instrument. Further research could also explore the relevant tools and instruments 
to enhance the governance of Ab-bandans from the viewpoints of farmers and other local stakeholders.  Further studies 
for the assessment of water-related challenges and relevant strategies for improvement of water resources, at different 
levels of government, (which can influence each other), are also recommended.   
5.3 Significance and contribution of the study  
This research has significance and contribution for the following reasons: 
• The unique contribution of this study is the way in which different research methodologies (modified Delphi
method, statistical analysis, mix methods, etc.) were applied to analyze the water governance issues. As
Seelen et al., (2019) have already cited, our second paper in the methodology section of their research
regarding public awareness of water usage in Europe, could also be used by other researchers following the
same procedures of this study, in order to analyze natural resource management.
• Furthermore, the OECD's framework has already been employed in 17 OECD member countries and 13 Latin
American countries, focusing more at the national level in the case of Mexico, Netherlands, Jordan, Tunisia,
and Brazil. It is important to note that, this study is the first attempt to use the OECD's framework in the case
of Iran; therefore, this research could provide inputs for international organizations, which are interested in
water governance issues in Middle Eastern countries.
• The main significance of this study is to provide valuable information about water governance in the
Mazandaran province, which could be used to provide a solution to the challenges in the water sector in Iran.
This research provides inputs for policy-makers to prioritize options to strengthen the governance of Ab-
bandans. If the new knowledge created in this study would be applied, related challenges in the governance
of Ab-bandans could be reduced. Many Iranian researchers (Raeisi et al., 2018; Valizadeh et al., 2018;
Valizadeh et al., 2019) have already cited the first paper in their water-related research. Identifying water
governance gaps and policy interments for improvement, as well as analysis of social capital at the local level
will contribute to the new knowledge not only in Iran but also to expand water studies in other countries with
similar water resources.
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5.4 Policy recommendations  
The hierarchy of policy instruments which are determined in the second paper could be applied as a road-map and 
policy advice for public authorities when making decisions regarding Ab-bandans. Based on this, the following policy 
recommendations are proposed:    
• The government should adopt strategies for the governance of water reservoirs to ensure that local 
stakeholders are encouraged and empowered to participate in the maintenance of Ab-bandans and related 
planning and decision-making. The top-down paradigm of government should be changed into a bottom-up 
paradigm by using participatory processes for decision-making, planning, and resolving conflicts among local 
stakeholders. Fostering co-operation and participation between local users through their involvement in the 
assessment and solving of water problems could also be effective for resolving conflicts within and between 
the communities. 
• A comprehensive and long-term national plan for the sustainable conservation of water resources in 
consistence with the ecological, economic, and social features should be addressed. Moreover, regional water 
management with respect to the role of Ab-bandans in irrigating rice fields and the sustainable use of their 
various potentials should also be included in this national planning. 
• Training and building the capacity of farmers as end-users for the protection of Ab-bandans is necessary. It 
is imperative to note that the training approach should be based on a participatory learning process and 
knowledge sharing among farmers. This is a totally different approach from simply delivering knowledge, 
and it aims to strengthen the problem-solving skills of farmers by fostering participation, self-confidence, 
dialogue, joint decision making, and self-determination. This training approach can increase farmers' 
knowledge and empower them to change their perspectives and behavior in order to be active in altering the 
current condition to a desired one. 
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